Schutz and Parsons: Problems of Meaning and Subjectivity

Abstract

Even the severest critic of Talcott Parsons must recognise the extraordinary nature of his contributions to social theory over a period of half a century. More than any other single scholar, Parsons has been responsible for introducing an Anglo-Saxon sociological audience to a sophisticated reading of the works of Durkheim and Max Weber — in addition to translating important segments of Weber’s writings. Parsons early on developed a critical stance towards positivism (in a certain sense of that term, at least) and behaviourism, and has always taken a firm stand against anti-theoretical tendencies in American sociology. He has produced a continuing flow of empirically orientated contributions himself, while never deviating from an overall strategy of developing a systematic framework of social theory. This framework was first of all outlined in The Structure of Social Action, originally published in 1937. There are many (including myself) who would regard this formidably long and dense volume as a greater achievement than any other single work or essay collection that Parsons has published subsequently.