Abstract
§ 1. In the preceding chapter we have seen reason to conclude that, while obedience to recognised rules of duty tends, under ordinary circumstances, to promote the happiness of the agent, there are yet no adequate empirical grounds for regarding the performance of duty as a universal or infallible means to the attainment of this end. Even, however, if it were otherwise, even if it were demonstrably reasonable for the egoist to choose duty at all costs under all circumstances, the systematic endeavour to realise this principle would not—according to common notions of morality—solve or supersede the problem of determining the right method for seeking happiness. For the received moral code allows within limits the pursuit of our own happiness, and even seems to regard it as morally prescribed;1 and still more emphatically inculcates the promotion of the happiness of other individuals, with whom we are in various ways specially connected: so that, under either head, the questions that we have before considered as to the determination and measurement of the elements of happiness would still require some kind of answer.
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© 1962 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Sidgwick, H. (1962). Deductive Hedonism. In: The Methods of Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-81786-3_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-81786-3_15
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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