The Application of Force

Abstract

The principle of minimum force set limits within which the police and military had to work. Compelled to use force in a highly selective manner, the British set about developing an apparatus of civil-military co-operation that allowed for tight administrative control of an area threatened by insurgents. Such an apparatus enabled the government to bring non-lethal pressure to bear on the inhabitants and to gather the kind of intelligence that would lead the security forces directly to the insurgents. Long before the post-war insurgencies, British soldiers had learned that, as Frank Kitson put it, ‘the problem of defeating insurgents consists very largely of finding them’.1 Once they were found, however, they still had to be eliminated. Military operations are a small but vital aspect of counterinsurgency. Winning the hearts and minds of the people is the key to success, but unless the soldiers, police and paramilitary forces can defeat the insurgent guerrillas in the field, they will concentrate on disrupting any reform and destroying the intelligence-gathering apparatus. The strategic-hamlet programme in Vietnam failed in part because the hamlets were not adequately protected.