Integration Through Referendums?

  • Simon Hug
  • Lars P. Feld

Abstract

Instruments of direct democracy have been considered both as hurdles to integration and as facilitating factors for integration. In the context of European Integration referendums are even envisioned as possible solutions to the ‘democratic deficit’. The insights from the literature on referendums do not allow, however, the role of direct democracy in processes of integration to be judged. In this chapter I explore with game theoretic tools the likely consequences of ratification referendums in an integration process. I show that referendums are likely to increase the legitimity of decisions but that the leeway for treaty revisions becomes smaller and integration may become more fragmented.

Keywords

Migration Europe Hull Arena Boulder 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Armingeon, K. (1995), ‘Comment: The Democratic Deficit of the European Union,’ Aussenwirtschaft, 50, 67–76.Google Scholar
  2. Black, D. (1958), ‘Theory of Commitees and Elections’, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Bogdanor, V. (1989), ‘Direct Elections, Representative Democracy and European Integration,’ Electoral Studies, 8, 205–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Bogdanor, V. (1994), ‘Western Europe,’ Butler, David and Austin Ranney (eds.), ‘Referendums Around the World’, London: MacMillan, 24–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Bogdanor, V. and S. Woodcock (1991), ‘The European Community and Sovereignty,’ Parliamentary Affairs, 44, 481–493.Google Scholar
  6. Boyce, B. (1993), ‘The Democratic Deficit of the European Community,’ Parliamentary Affairs, 46, 458–477.Google Scholar
  7. Christiansen, T. (1995), ‘Gemeinsinn und Europäische Integration. Strategien zur Optimierung von Demokratie- und Integrationsziel,’ Steffani, Winfried and Uwe Thaysen (eds.), ‘Demokratie in Europa: Zur Rolle der Parlamente’, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 50–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Cox, G. W. (1980), ‘Veto Groups and Stability in Voting Institutions,’ Mimeograph, University of Texas at Austin, Austin.Google Scholar
  9. Crombez, C. (1996), ‘Legislative Procedures in the European Community,’ British Journal of Political Science, 26, 199–228.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Dupont, C. (1994), ‘Domestic Politics, Information and International Bargaining. Comparative Models of Strategic Behavior in Non-Crisis Negotiations’, Thèse de doctorat ès sciences politiques, Université de Genève, Genève.Google Scholar
  11. Featherstone, K. (1994), ‘Jean Monnet and the ‘Democratic Deficit’ in the European Union,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 32, 149–170.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Feldmann, S. E. (1995), ‘Legislative Bargaining and the Initiative’, Paper prepared for presentation at the Summer Workshop ‘Analysis of Political Institutions,’ Mimeograph, Northwestern University, Evanston.Google Scholar
  13. Franklin, M., C. van der Eijk and M. Marsh (1995), ‘Referenda Fail to Give the Lie to Popular Support of Europe,’ West European Politics, 18, 101–117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Franklin, M., M. Marsh and C. Wlezien (1994), ‘Attitudes toward Europe and Referendum Votes: A Response to Siune and Svensson,’ Electoral Studies, 13, 117–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Franklin, M., M. Marsh and L. McLaren (1994), ‘Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 32, 455–472.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Frey, B. S. and G. Kirchgässner (1993), ‘Diskursethik, Politische Oekonomie und Volksabstimmungen,’ Analyse und Kritik, 15, 129–149.Google Scholar
  17. Gerber, E., (1996), ‘Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives,’ American Journal of Political Science, 40, 99–128.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Hammond, T. H. and G. J. Miller (1987), ‘The Core of the Constitution,’ American Political Science Review, 81, 1155–1174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Hamon, F. (1995), ‘Le référendum. Etude comparative’, Libraire générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris.Google Scholar
  20. Hubschmid, C. and P. Moser (1997), ‘The Cooperation Procedure in the EU: Why Was the European Parliament Influential in the Decision About Car Emission Standards,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 35, 225–242.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Hug, S. (1995), ‘What Causes Referendums? Uncertainty? Preferences? Institutions?’ Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Mimeograph, Chicago.Google Scholar
  22. Hug, S. (1997), ‘Non-Unitary Actors in Spatial Models. How Far Is Far in Foreign Policy?’, Paper prepared for presentation at the Joint Session of Workshops of the ECPR, Mimeograph, Bern.Google Scholar
  23. Hug, S. and P. Sciarini (2000), ‘Referendums on European Integration. Do Institutions Matter in the Voter’s Decision?,’ Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming.Google Scholar
  24. Jahn, D., A.-S. Storsved (1995), ‘Legitimacy through Referendum? The Nearly Successful Domino-Strategy of the EU-Referendums in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway,’ West European Politics, 18, 18–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Koehler, D. H. (1990), ‘The Size of the Yolk: Computations for Odd and Even-Numbered Committees,’ Social Choice and Welfare, 7, 231–245.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Körkemeyer, S. (1995), ‘Direkte Demokratie und Europäische Integration. Zu den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen unmittelbarer Volksbeteiligung an der staatlichen Willensbildung in der Europäischen Union, dargestellt am Beispiel der Schweiz, unter Berücksichtigung der Rechtslage in den derzeitigen EU-Mitgliedstaaten’, Bern: Stämpfli.Google Scholar
  27. Kramer, G. H. (1972), ‘Sophisticated Voting over Multidimensional Choice Spaces,’ Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 2, 165–180.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Lodge, J. (1994), ‘The European Parliament and The Authority-Democracy Crises,’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 531, 69–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Lodge, J. (1995), ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the EC: Crossing the Rubicon,’ International Journal of Public Administration, 18, 1595–1637.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Lupia, A. (1992), ‘Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information,’ American Political Science Review, 86, 390–404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Lupia, A. (1993), ‘Credibility and the Responsiveness of Direct Legislation,’ Barnett, William A., Norman J. Schofield and Melvin J. Hinich (eds.), ‘Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 379–404.Google Scholar
  32. Luthardt, W. (1994a), ‘Direkte Demokratie: Ein Vergleich in Westeuropa’, Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag.Google Scholar
  33. Luthardt, W. (1994b), ‘European Integration and Referendums,’ Ellwein, Thomas et al. (eds.), ‘Jahrbuch zur Staats- und Verwaltungswissenschaft’, Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag, 209–233.Google Scholar
  34. Luthardt, W. (1995), ‘Die Referenda zum Vertrag von Maastricht. Politikmanagement und Legitimation im europäischen Integrations-prozess,’ Steffani, Winfried and Uwe Thaysen (eds.), ‘Demokratie in Europa: Zur Rolle der Parlamente’, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 65–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Marquardt, P. D. (1994), ‘Deficit Reduction: Democracy, Technocracy, and Constitutionalism in the European Union,’ Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 4, 265–290.Google Scholar
  36. Meunier-Aitsahalia, S., and G. Ross (1993), ‘Democratic Deficit or Democratic Surplus: A Reply to Andrew Moravcsik’s Comments on the French Referendum,’ French Politics and Society, 11, 57–69.Google Scholar
  37. Miller, N. R. (1995), ‘Committees, Agendas, and Voting’, Chur: Harwood.Google Scholar
  38. Miller, N. R., B. Grofman and S. L. Feld (1989), ‘The Geometry of Majority Rule,’ Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1, 379–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Möckli, S. (1994), ‘Direkte Demokratie. Ein internationaler Vergleich’, Bern: Haupt.Google Scholar
  40. Moravcsik, A. (1993), ‘Idealism and Interest in the European Community: The Case of the French Referendum,’ French Politics and Society, 11, 45–55.Google Scholar
  41. Moser, P. (1996a), ‘Why is Swiss Politics so Stable?,’ Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, 132, 31–60.Google Scholar
  42. Moser, P. (1996b), ‘Zwischen Immobilität und Instabilität: Auswirkungen der Einführung von Gesetzesinitiative und Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit,’ Revue suisse de science politique, 2, 233–254.Google Scholar
  43. Moser, P. (1996c), ‘The European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: What Are the Conditions? A Critique of Tsebelis (1994),’ American Political Science Review, 90, 834–838.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Mueller, D. C. (1996), ‘Constitutional Democracy’, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  45. Pierce, R., H. Valen and O. Listhaug (1983), ‘Referendum Voting Behavior: The Norwegian and British Referenda on Membership in the European Community,’ American Journal of Political Science, 27, 43–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Romer, T.; and H. Rosenthal (1978), ‘Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo,’ Public Choice, 33, 27–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Romer, T., and H. Rosenthal (1979), ‘Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93, 561–587.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Rourke, J. T., R. P. Hiskes and C. E. Zirakzadeh (1992), ‘Direct Democracy and International Politics’, Boulder: Lynne Riemer.Google Scholar
  49. Schmitter, P. C. (1996), ‘How to Democratize the Emgerging Euro-Polity: Citizenship, Representation, Decision-Making’, Manuscript, Stanford University & Instituto Juan March, Stanford, Madrid.Google Scholar
  50. Schneider, F. (1995), ‘Some Elements of a European Federal Union: A Public Choice Approach’, Workingpaper 9518, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University, Linz.Google Scholar
  51. Schneider, G. and L.-E. Cederman (1994), ‘The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A limited Information Model of European Integration,’ International Organization, 48, 633–662.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. Schneider, G. and P. A. Weitsman (1996), ‘The Punishment Trap. Integration Referendums As Popularity Contests,’ Comparative Political Studies, 28, 582–607.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. Steunenberg, B. (1992), ‘Referendum, Initiative, and Veto Power,’ Kyklos, 45, 501–529.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. Steunenberg, B. (1994), ‘Decision Making under Different Institutional Arrangements: Legislation by the European Community,’ Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150, 642–669.Google Scholar
  55. Suksi, M. (1993), ‘Bringing in the People: A Comparison of Constitutional Forms and Practices of the Referendum’, Dordrecht: Martinus Nij-hoff.Google Scholar
  56. Tsebelis, G. (1994), ‘The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter,’ American Political Science Review, 88, 128–142.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  57. Tsebelis, G. (1995a), ‘Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicamerialism and Multipartyism,’ British Journal of Political Science, 25, 289–325.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  58. Tsebelis, G. (1995b), ‘Conditional Agenda-Setting and Decision-Making Inside the European Parliament,’ Journal of Legislative Studies, 1, 65–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  59. Tsebelis, G. and J. Money (1997), ‘Bicameralism’, New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  60. Ursprung, T. (1994a), ‘The Use and Effect of Political Propaganda in Democracies,’ Public Choice, 78, 259–282.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  61. Ursprung, T. (1994b), ‘Propaganda, Interessengruppen und direkte Demokratie’, Heidelberg: Physika-Verlag.Google Scholar
  62. Weiler, J. H. (1992), ‘After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in Post-1992 Europe,’ Adams, William James (ed.), ‘Singular Europe’, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 11–41.Google Scholar

References

  1. Feld, L. P. and G. Kirchgässner (1996), ‘Omne Agens Agendo Perficitur: The Economic Meaning of Subsidiarity,’ R. Holzmann (ed.), ‘Maastricht: Monetary Constitution without a Fiscal Constitution?’, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 195–226.Google Scholar
  2. Feld, L. P. and M. R. Savioz (1997), ‘Direct Democracy Matters for Economic Performance: An Empirical Investigation,’ Kyklos, 50, 507–538.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Frey, B. S. and R. Eichenberger (1996) ‘FOCJ: Competitive Governments for Europe,’ International Review of Law and Economics, 16, 315–327.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Moser, P. (1996), ‘Why Is Swiss Politics So Stable?’ Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, 132, 31–60.Google Scholar
  5. Popper, K. R. (1945), ‘The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. I: The Spell of Plato’, London: Routledge and Sons.Google Scholar
  6. Vaubel, R. (1996), ‘Constitutional Safeguards Against Centralisation in Federal States: An International Cross-Section Analysis,’ Constitutional Political Economy, 7, 79–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Simon Hug
  • Lars P. Feld

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations