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The Theory of Reciprocity

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Book cover The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

Abstract

There are gifts, including any act purposefully favourable to someone else and which is neither forced nor bought. Someone who receives a gift often feels the urge or the envy to reciprocate with a return gift, thus establishing a classical ‘gift/return-gift’ relationship. The initial giver may then give again, and so on, and a gift can be both a return gift of previous gifts and a cause of future return gifts. Such relations are reciprocities, including the elementary gift/return-gift. Reciprocities commonly associate several types of sentiment and motivation, such as self-interest, fellow-feeling, induced or reciprocal altruism, moral indebtedness, gratitude, fairness, sense of balance, good social relations, sense of community, norm — and duty — following and ‘proper’ behaviour, and others’ opinion and pressure, in various possible proportions. Pure gift-giving can be seen as a borderline case where the return gift vanishes.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, Paris, France

    Serge-Christophe Kolm

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  1. Serge-Christophe Kolm
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  1. Institute for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, Marseilles, France

    L.-A. Gérard-Varet (Professor) (Professor)

  2. Institute for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, Paris, France

    S.-C. Kolm (Director) (Director)

  3. Maître de Conférences, University of Paris La Sorbonne, France

    J. Mercier Ythier

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© 2000 International Economic Association

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Kolm, SC. (2000). The Theory of Reciprocity. In: Gérard-Varet, LA., Kolm, SC., Ythier, J.M. (eds) The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_5

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