Abstract
Societies have long sought to regulate ethically questionable activities by banning markets. Today, at the end of the 1990s, the United States bans markets in elephant tusks, endangered species, slaves, human organs, adopting babies, sex, forms of child labour, and certain hazardous activities. But whereas some market bans — such as those covering elephant tusks and endangered species — were enacted to prohibit trade altogether, the bans on markets in child adoption, sexual favours and human organs are characterized by a desire that the supply of these should flourish, but strictly on a donative, non-commercial basis.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Adler, R. S. and Pittle, R. D. (1984) ‘Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?’, Yale Journal on Regulation, vol. 1, pp. 159–93.
Arrow, K.J. (1972) ‘Gift and Exchanges’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, pp. 343–62.
Barney, L. D. Jr and Reynolds, R. L. (1989) ‘An Economic Analysis of Transplant Organs’, Atlantic Economic Journal, vol. 17, pp. 12–20.
Barzel, Y. (1997) Economic Analysis of Property Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2nd edn), pp. 105–13.
Bernardo, R. M. (1971) The Theory of Moral Incentives in Cuba, University of Alabama Press.
Brams, M. (1978) ‘Transplantable Human Organs: Should Their Sale Be Authorized by State Statute?’, American Journal of Law and Medicine, vol. 3, pp. 183–95.
Calabresi, G. and Melamed, A. D. (1972) ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 85, pp. 1089–128.
Cheung, S. (1974) ‘A Theory of Price Control’, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 17, pp. 53–71.
Collard, D. (1978) Altruism and Economy: A Study in Non-Selfish Economics, Oxford: Martin Robertson, pp. 147–50.
Cornes, R. and Sandler, T. (1986) The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dickens, B. M. (1977) ‘The Control of Living Body Materials’, University of Toronto Law Journal, vol. 27, pp. 142–98.
Epstein, R. (1985) ‘Why Restrain Alienation?’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 85, pp. 970–90.
Epstein, R. (1994) Organ Transplantation: Or, Altruism Run Amuck, Occasional Papers from the Law School No. 31, University of Chicago.
Gordon, H. S. (1954) ‘The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 17, pp. 121–42.
Hardin, G. (1968) ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science, vol. 162.
Kaserman, D. L. and Barnett, A. H. (1991) ‘An Economic Analysis of Transplant Organs: A Comment and Extension’, Atlantic Economic Journal, vol. 19, pp. 57–63.
Kessel, R. A. (1974) ‘Transfused Blood, Serum Hepatitis, and the Coase Theorem’, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 17, pp. 265–89.
Landes, E. M. and Posner, R. A. (1978) ‘The Economics of the Baby Shortage’, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 7, pp. 363–48.
MacDonald, J. E. and Valentin, E. K. (1988) ‘The Brave New World of Organ Transplantation: Issues and Challenges from a Consumer Affairs Perspective’, Journal of Consumer Affairs, vol. 22, pp. 119–35.
Meckler, L. (1998) ‘Organ Donation Effort Meets With Opposition’, Associated Press, 18 July.
Office of the Inspector General (1987) Organ Acquisition Costs: An Overview, Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Analysis and Inspections.
Okun, A. M. (1975) Equity and Efficiency: The Great Tradeoff, Washington, DC: Brookings institution.
Pindyck, R. S. and Rubinfeld, D. L. (1989) Microeconomics, Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice Hall.
Rabin, M. I. (1987) ‘Market-Inalienability’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 100, no. 8, pp. 1849–937.
Robertson, D. H. (1956) ‘What Does the Economist Economize?’, in Economic Commentaries, London: Staples Press, vol. 5, p. 147.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1985) ‘Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 85, pp. 931–69.
Rosenthal, E. (1993) ‘Parents Find Solace in Donating Organs’, New York Times, 11 May.
Shumway, N. (1993) quoted in ‘Parents Find Solace in Donating Organs’, Elaine Rosenthal, New York Times, 11 May.
Siegelbaum, L. H. (1988) Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the U.S.S.R., 1935–1941, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Solow, R. M. (1971) ‘Blood and Thunder’, Yale Law Journal, vol. 80, pp. 1696–711.
Task Force on Organ Transplantation, U.S. Dept of Health and Human Services (1986) Organ Transplantation: Issues and Recommendations 35.
Thorne, E. D. (1990) ‘Tissue Transplants: The Dilemma of the Body’s Growing Value’, Public Interest (Winter), pp. 37–48.
Thorne, E. D. (1996) ‘The Cost of Procuring Market-Inalienable Human Organs’, Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 10, pp. 191–200.
Thorne, E. D. (1998a) ‘When Private Parts are Made Public Goods: The Economics of Market-Inalienability’, Yale Journal on Regulation, vol. 15, pp. 149–75.
Thorne, E. D. (1998b) ‘The Shortage in Market-Inalienable Human Organs: A Consideration of “Non-Market” Failures’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 56, pp. 247–60.
Titmuss, R. (1971) The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, London: Allen and Unwin.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2000 International Economic Association
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Thorne, E.D. (2000). The Common Property Nature of Market-inalienability. In: Gérard-Varet, LA., Kolm, SC., Ythier, J.M. (eds) The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-62747-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-62745-5
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)