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The Common Property Nature of Market-inalienability

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The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

Abstract

Societies have long sought to regulate ethically questionable activities by banning markets. Today, at the end of the 1990s, the United States bans markets in elephant tusks, endangered species, slaves, human organs, adopting babies, sex, forms of child labour, and certain hazardous activities. But whereas some market bans — such as those covering elephant tusks and endangered species — were enacted to prohibit trade altogether, the bans on markets in child adoption, sexual favours and human organs are characterized by a desire that the supply of these should flourish, but strictly on a donative, non-commercial basis.

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© 2000 International Economic Association

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Thorne, E.D. (2000). The Common Property Nature of Market-inalienability. In: Gérard-Varet, LA., Kolm, SC., Ythier, J.M. (eds) The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_2

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-62747-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-62745-5

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