New World of Work: Employment, Unemployment, and Adaptation

  • Walter D. Connor


When the time comes to write the first economic history of post-Soviet Russia, it is probable that, given sufficient perspective, the whole period from 1 January 1992 until the summer of 1998 will be treated as a single period—or at most two periods—wherein the working population of the Russian Federation, as earners, consumers, and providers for their dependents, underwent a harsh and wrenching, but not altogether negative, period of adjustment to new economic conditions. This transitional period, it will be argued, came to an end with the devaluation of the ruble, the effective default on most of its external debt, and the consequent collapse of Russia’s precarious position in the world economy. At home, the crash of the ruble and consequent rapid inflation experienced by a population more and more dependent on imports threatened the measure of comfort and security—thin as it was—that some Russians (not just the “new Russian” super-rich) had achieved, and heralded further distress for the larger numbers who had experienced mainly economic disadvantage since the end of 1991.


Labor Force Trade Union External Debt Excess Labor Soviet Period 
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© Mark G. Field and Judyth L. Twigg 2000

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  • Walter D. Connor

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