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Abstract

This crisis over Berlin sparked Norstad to consider how best to coordinate NATO plans and policy in a situation in which the “rights” were non-NATO in origin, even though the “responsibilities” had become SACEUR’s. As recalled in the previous chapter, the three “Occupying Powers” — the US, the UK, and France — were still in Berlin by right of conquest. The other member-states of NATO had no direct involvement in the evolution of the status of Berlin stemming from the Yalta Declaration to its de facto partitioning.2 Consequently, in February 1959 Norstad directed the establishment at Headquarters USEUCOM of a “small concealed US only group as nucleus for any tripartite staff he might have to form.”3

The Berlin Crisis was in fact one of the most important episodes in the history of great power politics in the nuclear age.1

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Notes

  1. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 169.

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  2. For a summary of the developments that led to the partitioning of Berlin between the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers, see Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1977), Ch. XIV; also Wolfgang Heidelmeyer and Guenter Hindrichs, Documents on Berlin, 1943–1963 (Munich: R. Oldlenbourg Verlag, 1963).

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  3. The Headquarters, USAREUR, was located at Heidelberg. Regarding LIVE OAK, see Gregory Pedlow, “Allied Crisis Management for Berlin: The LIVE OAK Organization, 1959–1963,” in William W. Epley, ed. International Cold War Military Records and History: Proceedings of the International Conference on Cold War Military Records and History Held in Washington, D.C. 21–26 March 1994 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1996), pp. 87–116. Also see note 12 below.

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  4. See Simon Serfaty, De Gaulle and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republic Towards the Continent (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 33–39; Frank Costigliola, France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II (Boston; Twayne Publishers, 1992).

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  5. See Jack M. Schick, The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), p. 54; also Nigel Fisher, Macmillan: a Biography (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), pp. 212–214; for more on Macmillan, see Alistair Home, Macmillan 1894–1950: Volume One of the Official Biography (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1988). Macmillan characterized the visit as a “reconnaissance” rather than a negotiation.

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© 2000 Robert S. Jordan

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Jordan, R.S. (2000). The Berlin Crisis Intensifies. In: Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62477-5_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62477-5_7

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-62479-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-62477-5

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