Abstract
Having come to Europe as Commander-in-Chief, US Air Forces, Europe (CINCUSAFE), Norstad was all too familiar with the problems and possibilities of creating an effective “nuclear umbrella” for NATO. Even though, as pointed out earlier, nuclear weapons played no formal part in the early planning of NATO, Norstad had emphasized that NATO could not just ignore them. He was convinced that a way must be found to give the European Allies a sense of sharing in the formulation of the doctrine for their employment and, if deterrence were to fail, their possible use. The issue, in a nutshell, was whether NATO nuclear proliferation should be unilateral or multilateral. In this respect, he had to work closely with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as well as with France and Britain. As it was put:
The relationship between the nuclearization of NATO and the settlement with the Federal Republic is not totally clear, but I suspect that there was an important link: nuclearization meant that the Americans, who controlled the most important forces and who in effect operated the strategy, would have to stay in Europe for a very considerable period of time, and as long as the Americans were in the French and many of the other allies could be relatively relaxed about a buildup of German power. Any possible German threat would be contained in a structure dominated by American power.2
Our requirements are all on a minimum basis, designed to meet conditions of a general war which would involve major Soviet participation.1
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Notes
Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 163.
This entire question is discussed fully in James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), esp. Ch 1 and 3. As early as Autumn 1949, the U.S. Army General Staff had drafted a plan for the creation of German divisions that was endorsed by the JCS in April 1950. The plan was not adopted as official policy because the State Department claimed that European objections would be too strong. (Richardson, Germany, pp. 18.)
For a survey of Britain’s attempts to stay in the ballistic missile field, see William P. Snyder, The Politics of British Defense Policy, 1945–1962 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1964), pp. 24ff.
A complete discussion of types of alliances can be found in Julian Freedman et al., Alliance in International Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970). See esp., K.J. Holsti, “Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances,” pp. 93–103.
Norstad, comment at Eisenhower Library conference. For a good discussion of the French view, see General Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Missile Age (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1961).
Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European 1936–1966 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 341–342.
Quoted in McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), p. 473. Bundy felt that if Norstad had requested permission from Eisenhower to provide the information de Gaulle wanted, he would have received it.
Charles De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor, trans. Terence Kilmartin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), pp. 257–258.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1965) p. 427.
Department of State, Memo of Conversation, “Tripartism,” dtd 2/4/59 (NSA, Berlin, Norstad). It should be pointed out, however, that at this time other voices were suggesting thoughts similar to de Gaulle’s “globalist” conception for NATO. One, in fact, was Spaak’s, who advocated that NATO should be geared to meet the Soviet Union’s economic challenge in the underdeveloped countries. In fact, Spaak soon resigned as Secretary-General to resume the Premiership of Belgium precisely over his concern about the effects of decolonization on global politics. (See Robert S. Jordan, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979) pp. 91ff.).
For more on the Anglo-American relationship and NATO, see Robert S. Jordan, The NATO International Staff/Secretariat 1952–1957: A Study in International Administration (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Don Cook, Forging the Alliance: The Birth of the NATO Treaty and the Dramatic Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy Between 1945 and 1950 (New York: Arbor House/William Morrow, 1989). NATO’s “doyen” during this period, compiled a useful book — André de Staercke, NATO’s Anxious Birth: the Prophetic Vision of the 1940s, ed. Nicholas Sherwen (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1985).
For a complete discussion, see Robert S. Jordan, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 86–94.
It had been established in 1958 that SACLANT’s requirements in the European theater were to be closely coordinated with those of SACEUR and covered by whatever arrangements were worked out between the United States and the host countries concerned with respect to European elements of the NATO atomic stockpile. In other words, there were to be no separately arrived at arrangements for the SACLANT atomic stockpile, or separate negotiations between SACLANT and the European countries involved. Ltr, Timmons-Wolf, dtd 9/23/58 (NA, State Dept., Eur. Aff., Atl. Pol-Mil. Aff., NATO, 1957–64, Box 1). See also Robert S. Jordan, Alliance Strategy and Navies: The Evolution and Scope of NATO’s Maritime Dimension (London: Pinter Publishers; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), for a more detailed discussion of these events.
Ltr Norstad-Eisenhower, dtd 1/19/60 (EL, EP, Box 28, Norstad-Gen Lauris [1]). Norstad went on to comment: “I must say that it might be workable. My main criticism would be that making a greater monstrosity out of an already monstrous organization is something of an offense against common sense.” See also Simon Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, eds., U.S. Military Forces in Europe, the Early Years (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 35.
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Jordan, R.S. (2000). Nuclear Weapons for Europe’s Defense: Norstad and the Eisenhower Administration. In: Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62477-5_5
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