There was a time when everything was simple. Today, everything has to be interpreted and reinterpreted. How did this change take place? Why is it that nowadays all historical texts seem to be ‘difficult’, so that they have to be endlessly explained, provided with commentaries and perhaps also polished up a bit? Why is it that hermeneutics — the science of interpretation — has changed from being an insignificant minor discipline into a universal practice in the humanities and even a completely separate school of philosophical thought?


Stylistic Process Ordinary Experience Classical Answer Imaginative Variation Historical Distance 
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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Theo de Boer

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