NATO’s Strategy: Past, Present, and Future

  • Steven L. Rearden


By the mid-1990s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faced an uncertain future, its traditional strategy in disarray now that the Cold War was over. Some critics argued that, because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO strategy, like the alliance itself, had outlived its usefulness.1 But as new dangers from ethnic and religious tensions along the periphery of the old Soviet empire erupted, the reasons for keeping NATO alive and well arguably remained strong. Even former members of the Warsaw Pact were clamoring to be part of NATO. The alliance was, in other words, a rallying point for peace and stability in a troubled world, and as such continued to serve a useful purpose. Accordingly, in preparing for the years ahead, NATO still needed an up-to-date strategic concept around which its members could organize themselves, plan for future contingencies, and allocate their national resources.


Nuclear Weapon Flexible Response North Atlantic Treaty Organization Ballistic Missile Cruise Missile 
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Copyright information

© S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss 1995

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  • Steven L. Rearden

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