Abstract
As suggested in the previous chapters, any complete discussion of nuclear arms control needs an ultimate point of reference, a long-term goal toward which arms reductions and operational arms control are working. Current nuclear cuts are taking place in a teleological vacuum; to what end are they being pursued? What is the desired nuclear end state? Because one does not exist, the case for additional reductions lacks force; why go below 3,000 strategic warheads, for example, if not as part of a plan to achieve general disarmament?
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Notes
Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 166–167.
The Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Living with Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), especially pp. 3–68.
Some writers argue that the risk has already disappeared; see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
Alton Frye, “Zero Ballistic Missiles,” Foreign Policy 88 (Fall 1992): p. 3.
See Richard A. Falk, “Nuclear Policy and World Order: Why Denuclearization?” in Burns H. Weston, ed., Toward Nuclear Disarmament and Global Security: A Search for Alternatives (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 463–81;
Thomas Bernauer, Nuclear Issues on the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1991); and Gar Alpovitz and Kai Bird, “Dream of Total Disarmament Could Become Reality,” Los Angeles Times, January 12, 1992.
Corrections for the rotation of the earth or limitations imposed by the earth’s atmosphere can be neglected for boost-phase intercept. See Christopher T. Cunningham, “The Space-Based Interceptor,” in Dietrich Schroeer and David Hafemeister, eds., Nuclear Arms Technologies in the 1990s (New York: American Institute of Physics, 1988), p. 269.
James W. Winnefeld and Carl H. Builder, “ASW—Now or Never,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 97 (September 1971), p. 21, quoted in Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood, Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force: Why and How (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1976), p. 45; and The START Treaty and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, October 1991), p. 157.
D. Douglass Dalgleish and Larry Schweikart, Trident (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 29.
See the National Academy of Sciences, The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1991); George Perkovich, “Counting the Costs of the Arms Race,” Foreign Policy No. 85 (Winter 1991–92); Fred Chernoff, “START or Finish? The Future of Strategic Arms Control and Profound Force Reductions,” Defense Analysis 6/3 (September 1990); and Harold A. Feiveson and Frank N. von Hippel, “Beyond START: How to Make Much Deeper Cuts,” International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990).
Paul Doty, “Arms Control: 1960, 1990, 2020,” Daedalus 120/4 (Winter 1991), pp. 48–49.
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 274–5.
George Quester, “The Difficult Logic of Terminating a Nuclear War,” in Steven Cimbala, ed., Strategic War Termination (New York: Praeger, 1986), p. 71. Richard Betts wonders “whether it is wise to threaten Soviet ICBMs even under the logic of the countervailing strategy….Escalation control might argue against a threat large enough to provoke launch on warning.” Betts, Cruise Missiles and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982), 18.
See also Philip Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), p. 174, where he argues that the lack of a countersilo capability might actually help U.S. strategy “because it reduces [U.S.] self-deterrence lest the Soviet Union fear that its control systems are being attacked.”
See Andrew Goldberg, “Offense and Defense in the Postnuclear Era,” The Washington Quarterly 11/2 (Spring 1988), p. 58; Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence, pp. 147–48;
and Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 106–9.
Michael Nacht, The Age of Vulnerability: Threats to the Nuclear Stalemate (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 93.
Ashton Carter, “Emerging Themes in Nuclear Arms Control,” Daedalus 120/4 (Winter 1991), p. 241.
Counterpower strategies have been examined at length elsewhere. See Jeffrey Richelson, “The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting,” in Desmond Ball and Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Bernard Albert, “Constructive Counterpower,” Orbis 20/3 (Summer 1976); and Bruce Russett, “Assured Destruction of What? A Coun-tercombatant Alternative to Nuclear MADness,” Public Policy 22/2 (Spring 1974).
For an analysis of the minimum deterrence/counterpower connection, see Bruce Russett, “An Acceptable Role for Nuclear Weapons,” in Charles W. Kegley and Kenneth L. Schwab, eds., After the Cold War: Questioning the Morality of Nuclear Deterrence (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 136–39.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1990–91 (London: IISS, 1991), p. 34.
John W. R. Lepingwell, “Towards a Post-Soviet Army,” Orbis 36/1 (Winter 1992), p. 98.
Kosta Tsipis, Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear Age (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 48–67.
U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 81.
Thomas Cochran, William Arkin, Robert Norris, and Jeffrey Sands, Soviet Nuclear Weapons, vol. IV of Nuclear Weapons Databook (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), p. 61. These bases include Adler, Alekseyevka, Anadyr, Belaya, Bykhov, Bobruysk, Chernyakhovsk, Dolan, Engel’s, Murmansk, Mys Shmidta, Oktyabr’skoye, Olenegorsk, Ramenskoye, Saki, Sol’tsy, Tartu, Tiksi, Ukraina, Vladimirovka, Varkuta, and Voronezh.
Theodore Postol, “Targeting,” in Ashton Carter, John Steinbruner, and Charles Zraket, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 377–78, 392–93.
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© 1994 Center for Strategic and International Studies
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Fetter, S., Mazarr, M.J. (1994). Nuclear End States. In: Mazarr, M.J., Lennon, A.T. (eds) Toward a Nuclear Peace. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-60793-8_7
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