Skip to main content

Lloyds: a Deviant Case, Rejecting Universal Banking

  • Chapter
  • 16 Accesses

Abstract

An analysis of institutions that do not fit existing paradigms often reveals more significant insights about the industries of which they are a part than does a similar analysis of those that fit the mould. Lloyds is such a case in the recent history of its industry, and an analysis of its leadership and strategic choices since the early 1970s can tell us a lot about the recent evolution of British banking and about what configurations of strategy and organization are likely to distinguish the high from the low performers in the future.

When the UK banks were in a risk-free environment, they had a volume culture. And they applied the same mentality to investment banking. Pitman [the Lloyds CEO] was an exception to this culture. He pursued a different strategy and a blindingly obvious one. Instead of volume and size, he looked at return on capital and shareholder value and got out of the losing businesses. He closed down his small investment bank and many international businesses. Instead, he chose personal banking, where the higher profits were, and now he has added to that many other retail businesses through a series of mergers. All this was blindingly obvious, but none of the others did it. It merely involves concentrating on what you do well.

Banking journalist

Pitman talked about ROE and his formula was simple: if it makes money, we’ll do it, and if not, we won’t. This was an extraordinary concept for British banking at that time. It was out of line with how our banks were managed.

Bank analyst

Lloyds’ numbers are indeed impressive. Pitman is the master of the simplified agenda, but I am not sure that it has a true strategic view. He did get rid of some nasty eggs in the portfolio and he is a master of managing it all. And he doesn’t have the other baggage (investment banking) of the clearers. Beyond that, he has bought well. He is a test of the big baron theory. He is very charismatic in representing his agenda and carrying it home. But ego sometimes gets in the way of big barons on capital allocation decisions, and he may make some bad ones in the future. So the big baron stuff is a worrier.

Management consultant

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes and references

  1. From Bloomberg, Financial Markets (online).

    Google Scholar 

  2. Lehman Brothers, UK Clearing Banks: 1998 Annual Review, 23 July 1998, p. 107.

    Google Scholar 

  3. The Economist, 17 January 1998, pp. 65–6.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Lehman Brothers, op. cit.

    Google Scholar 

  5. J.R. Winston, Lloyds Bank, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982, p. 28ff.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Steven I. Davis, Leadership in Financial Services, Macmillan Business, Basingstoke and London, 1997, pp. 94–8.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  7. The Economist, 17 January 1998, p. 65.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Financial Times, 21 September 1996; and The Economist, 19 September 1997.

    Google Scholar 

  9. R.S. Sayers, Lloyds Bank in the History of English Banking, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1957.

    Google Scholar 

  10. The Economist, 19 September 1987.

    Google Scholar 

  11. The Economist, 17 January 1988, p. 65.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Financial Times, 11 February 1994. For a discussion of bancassurance in France and its twin, Allfinanz in Germany, and of the potential synergy of combining banking and insurance, see Roy Smith, Comeback, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1993, pp. 181–3.

    Google Scholar 

  13. The Economist, 16 October 1995.

    Google Scholar 

  14. The Economist, 19 April 1978 and 2 July 1988.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Financial Times, 23 April 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  16. An example is The Economist, 17 September 1987.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Financial Times, 25 March 1992.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Steven I. Davis, op. cit., pp. 94–8.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  19. Raymond E. Miles and Charles C. Snow, Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1978.

    Google Scholar 

  20. The Economist, 23 April 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  21. This was similar to the structure that Jack Welch instituted at GE, one of the US firms that Pitman reportedly admired. A description appears in General Electric: Jack Welch’s Second Wave (A), Harvard Business School, 9-391-248, 1 April 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ, 1979, p. 308.

    Google Scholar 

  23. The Economist, 22 July 1995.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Steven I. Davis, op. cit., pp 94–5

    Book  Google Scholar 

  25. Most of the data in this section come from Lehman Brothers, op. cit., or Bloomberg financial analysis unless otherwise indicated.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Salomon Brothers, Lloyds Bank Plc — Momentum Returns, European Equity Research, 3 March 1995, p. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  27. Salomon Brothers, Lloyds TSB Group — From Strength to Strength, European Equity Research, 2 March 1997.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Lehman Brothers, op. cit., p. 107.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Copyright information

© 1999 David Rogers

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Rogers, D. (1999). Lloyds: a Deviant Case, Rejecting Universal Banking. In: The Big Four British Banks. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-27760-5_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics