Abstract
The institutional environment in which monetary policies are conducted in Euroland is by now well established. The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is solely responsible for the conduct of monetary policy. Its mandate is to maintain price stability. Other objectives, such as output stabilisation, can be pursued by the ESCB provided these do not interfere with the primary objective of price stability. This institutional structure creates the possibility of conflicts about macroeconomic policies in Euroland.
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© 1999 Paul De Grauwe, Hans Dewachter and Yunus Aksoy
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De Grauwe, P., Dewachter, H., Aksoy, Y. (1999). On the Conduct of Monetary Policy in an Asymmetric Euroland. In: Cobham, D., Zis, G. (eds) From EMS to EMU: 1979 to 1999 and Beyond. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-27745-2_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-27745-2_14
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