Abstract
The objective of this chapter is to outline five solutions to the problem of fragmentary evidence. There is no guarantee, it needs to be emphasised, that the solutions will allow us to create truthful accounts — ones that comprehensively correspond to reality. They will, however, give us the capacity (all things being equal) to produce accounts that are more reliable than those based solely on fragmentary evidence or on fragmentary evidence used in conjunction with the testimonies of contemporary experts and/or our own common-sense beliefs. Although I have distinguished the solutions for the purposes of discussion and clarity, they can in fact by employed in whatever combination the practitioner finds appropriate.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes, References and Further Reading
A. Macfarlane, Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England, London, 1970, p. 168.
G. King, R.O. Keohane, and S. Verba, Designing Social Inquiry; Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton, 1994, suggest and discuss a multitude of good techniques for the method.
See Carl Hempel, ‘The Function of General Laws in History’, in P. Gardiner, ed., Theories of History, Glencoe, 1959. The issue of whether there were covering laws in history was much debated in the 1950s and 1960s, as shown by the issues in the journal, History and Theory. For a summary of the debate see Louis O. Mink, ‘Philosophy and Theory of History’, in Iggers and Parker, eds, International Handbook. A good summary of Hempel is in Lloyd, Explanation, pp. 46ff, 61ff.
I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers, ed., J. Worrall and G. Currie, vol. 1, Cambridge, 1978. For a useful summary of Lakatos see Lloyd, Explanation, pp. 78ff.
L. Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy: 1558–1641, Oxford, 1965. To my knowledge, Stone has not discussed his views on methodology, at least not systematically, in any publication. In a collection of essays, however, he hints that it consists of a ‘feedback process’ by which hunches are tested by data and the data in turn generate new hunches; see his The Past and the Present Revisited, p. 29.
Stone, Crisis, pp. 3, 7–8.
Stone, Crisis, pp. 12–13.
Stone, Crisis, pp. 746–7. For other discussions in the text on the importance of status see e.g. 223.
Note that Stone, Crisis, p. 746, confuses the issue about whether the preoccupation with status was peculiar to pre-modern societies. He quotes a sociologist, T.H. Marshall, to the effect that the high value placed on status is universal. His view that pre-modern societies place a much greater value on status than modern societies is much clearer in a later article on the long-term trends in violence in England, ‘Homicide and Violence’, in his The Past and the Present Revisited, pp. 295–310.
Stone, Crisis, pp. 747ff.
He summarises the causes himself in his conclusion, pp. 748–9.
Stone, Crisis, pp. 199–270. For praise of Stone on this issue, see Hexter, On Historians, p. 170.
When the book first emerged most of the critics tended to focus on his hypothesis that the aristocracy had declined in wealth. The preoccupation was perhaps inevitable given that the book came out near the end of protracted and heated debate which R.H. Tawney had sparked in 1941 about whether the aristocracy or the gentry had experienced a decline in wealth prior to the Civil War.
Many philosophers of science claim that the problem of ‘underdetermination’ also prevails in the physical sciences. See L. Laudan, Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science, Chicago, 1990, Ch. 2.
Translated by J. and A. Tedeschi, Baltimore, 1980.
Ginzburg, Cheese and Worms, pp. 8, 103. There were other members of the tribunal but Ginzburg is not entirely clear about who they were.
Ginzburg, Cheese and Worms, p. 75.
Ginzburg, Cheese and Worms, p. 66.
Ginzburg, Cheese and Worms, p. 53.
Ginzburg, Cheese and Worms, pp. 41, xxiii, xii; also xix, 20–1, 33, 58–9, 60–1, 68, 112, 117.
Ginzburg, Cheese and Worms, pp. 62–5, 68.
Ginzburg, Cheese and Worms, pp. 112ff. On the face of it, another kind of evidence that is inconsistent with the claim is that Menocchio’s opinions were described as fantastic by his fellow villages. However, these descriptions are suspect given that they were responses to the inquisitor. Moreover, Ginzburg presents clear evidence that Menocchio was accepted, even respected, by his fellow villagers, see pp. 2, 95.
Ginzburg, Cheese and Worms, pp. 6–7.
Ginzburg, Cheese and Worms, pp. 18–19.
Ginzburg, Cheese and Worms, pp. 19–21.
Ginzburg, Cheese and Worms, pp. 50, 81. Although note that Ginzburg concedes that Menocchio knew such a man, a painter, who probably lent him books, see pp. 21–7.
K. Popper, ‘The Rationality Principle’ in Popper Selections, D. Miller, ed., Princeton, 1985. (An earlier edition of this is The Pocket Popper, D. Miller, ed., Oxford, 1983.)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1999 Miles Fairburn
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Fairburn, M. (1999). Some Solutions for the Problem of Fragmentary Evidence. In: Social History. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-27517-5_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-27517-5_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-61587-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-27517-5
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)