Nietzsche, Enlightenment and the Problem of Noble Ethics

Abstract

This essay focuses on two questions in relation to Nietzsche’s work. First, what is ‘the problem of the noble ideal’ that Nietzsche identifies in section 16 of the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morality? Second, how does Nietzsche seek to seduce us with the noble ideal which he recommends? However, I will begin by placing these questions in context by raising the issue of Nietzsche’s relationship to the question of enlightenment in German philosophy. The rationale for this strategy is to illustrate both that Nietzsche is committed to the enlightenment ideal of maturity as self-government and that his critique of the enlightenment commitment to transcendental standards of rationality entails that his commitment to maturity can only disclose itself as a recommendation.

This essay is both a continuation and critique of arguments developed in Owen (1995). Unquestionably the spur to the latter has been a series of pub conversations with Aaron Ridley with respect to his own current work on Nietzsche (see his Nietzsche’s Conscience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming)), and I am grateful to Aaron for his provocation. I would also like to thank John Lippitt for his helpful suggestions. For sigla used in my citations, see the Reference Key to Nietzsche’s Texts on p. xii.