Abstract
By early 1946 Bevin had the long-term aim of reviving the old wartime Anglo-American alliance. Initially, it seemed only possible to do this on the level of military co-operation. By the end of 1946 that was well under way. Co-operation was close, except in the atomic field. And there was the suspicion that Britain could not always rely on the United States. The Foreign Office was accused by some State Department officials of spreading propaganda that the United States was a ‘conglomerate of ill-assorted groups’.
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Notes
Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance, pp. 211–24; W. Stueck, ‘The Limits of Influence: British Policy and the American Expansion of the War in Korea’, Pacific Historical Review, vol. 55 (1986), pp. 65–96
R.J. Foot, ‘Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis: The British Effort to Avert an Expanded War, December 1950–January 1951’, Diplomatic History, X (1986), pp. 43–57.
CAB 129/46, fos 89–96, CP(51)166, Memorandum by Morrison on Japanese peace treaty, Secret, 19 June 1951; C. Hosoya, ‘Japan, China, the United States and the United Kingdom, 1951–2: The Case of the “Yoshida Letter”’, International Affairs, vol. 60 (1984), pp. 247–59.
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© 1998 Ritchie Ovendale
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Ovendale, R. (1998). The Cold War: Global Strategy. In: Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century. British History in Perspective. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26992-1_5
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