Abstract
In Chapter 3 we traced the events which led to the mediation of the UN Secretary General’s office in El Salvador’s civil war. The key events were the signing of the April 1990 protocol in Geneva, and the settlement of the Caracas agenda (May), mapping out a detailed timetable for topics to be negotiated. In December the leaders of the major political parties signed a pact, unifying on paper their joint commitment to a negotiated settlement.
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Notes and References
Casa Presidencial, 3 pm. Present were Angulo, Calderón Sol, Juan José Domenech, Pablo Alvergue, Le Chevallier.
Casa Presidencial. Present were Cristiani, Calderón Sol, Chávez Mena, Alvergue.
I do not know if the ‘us’ in the sentence refers to the Christian Democrats alone or to them and the High Command. CD are the Spanish initials for the Democratic Convergence, a coalition of parties to the left of the Christian Democrats. Minutes of the meeting with Chávez Mena and Le Chevallier with the High Command in San Salvador, 14 January 1991 at 9 a.m.
On 6 December 1989, House Speaker Tom Foley appointed Rep. Joe Moakley (D-MA) to head a Congressional task force on the Jesuit murders. Doggett, 1995.
Casa Presidencial. Present were Cristiani, Angulo, Chavez Mena, Vieytez, Le Chevallier.
Nikken thought Escobar Galindo was determinante.
Not coincidentally, Salvador Samayoa wanted the next meeting to be in Havana, rather than Mexico.
Minutes of 4 February 1991, Handal, Villalobos, Le Chevallier; Samayoa with unnamed source, 5 February 1991; of FPL with Eduardo Colindres, 31 January 1991; and Nidia Díaz, 5 February 1991.
The innocuous name of the commission reflects the inability of the two sides to agree on what to call the body which would be responsible for purging the officer corps.
Notes from meetings of the IP, 11, 13, and 15 February 1991.
Acuerdos sobre desmilitarización, minutes of 28 February 1991.
Guillermo Ungo died on 28 February in Mexico City of a brain embolism. FBIS-LAT-91–041, p. 33.
The 10 March elections gave ARENA 39 of 84 seats, thereby losing their absolute majority. The PDC was placed second, with 26 seats. Inforpress, 5 April 1991 p. 93.
Ibid.
Villalobos announced his desire to reform Article 248 at the 3–5 January meetings. Minutes, 4 February 1991.
Negotiating the ceasefire/demilitarization were Vargas, Rodolfo Parker, Abelardo Torres, Ricardo Castaneda and FMLN Commanders Villalobos, Jonas, Hercules, Marcelo and Rogelio. On reforms: Hernán Contreras, Santamaría, Escobar Galindo, and Martínez Varela versus Handal et al.
‘A partir del 2 abril la negociación se acelera. No interfieran, conviértanse en bomberos.’ An unidentified person asks, ‘Y cómo entramos?’ Nikken with PDC, San Salvador, 7 pm, Thursday, 21 March 1991.
See also Córdova, 1993, pp. 84–5; and UN minutes, 22 April 1991, Benítez Manaut, 1993, pp. 42–3 for an overview of the involvement of the political parties in the April round.
Minutes of 22 April 1991. In attendance were Angulo and Guerrero (ARENA), Chávez Mena, Vieytez, Acevedo and Le Chevallier (PDC), Antonio Guevara Lacayo and Adolfo Rey Prendes (MAC), Ciro Cruz Zepeda, Rafael Machuca, and Dagoberto Marroquín (PCN).
CEA stands for cese de enfrentamiento armado (ceasefire). CEV is Comisión Especial de la Verdad (Truth Commission).
Minutes, 4th meeting of the 4 parties and the PDC with the UN. The meeting took place very late on 22 April or very early on 23 April 1991.
Córdova, 1993, pp. 85–6; IP/FMLN minutes, 21–22 May 1991, Hotel Intercontinental, Managua. As suggested during that meeting, legislative approval of the reforms actually occurred in blocks, beginning with those that would not effect the capacity of the state to defend itself. Human rights and the judiciary were on 31 October as per Decree 64; and reforms to the armed forces after the ceasefire, on 30 January 1992, as per Decree 152.
Alvaro de Soto in Proceso (Mexico) 12, 26 June 1991, p. 6.
Qué hacemos si logramos la paz?
‘[Ruben Zamora] negotiates just to negotiate. He starts the day negotiating which briefcase to put his papers in. He prefers 5 per cent of the vote for himself rather than a ton with us.’ Notes from a meeting with Samayoa, 22 May 1991 Managua.
Some texts refer to these meetings as having taken place in Carabellada.
Respectively, Carlos Salinas, Carlos Andrés Pérez, and César Gaviria.
Vargas had had strong words with the Cuban representative to the UN, José Abreu, telling him ‘Cuba’s problems with the United States do not have to be resolved in El Salvador. Supporting the FMLN is equivalent to justifying the Bay of Pigs.’ (30 June 1991).
Walker’s staff aide in San Salvador and the on-site reporting officer at many of the negotiation sessions.
Personal notes of observers in New York and San Salvador; see also Córdova, 1993, pp. 95–7.
The voting members of COPAZ included five members of the government and five of the opposition, so that decisions would have to be made by consensus. See Córdova, 1993, pp. 101–2; La Jornada (Mexico) ‘Instalada, la Comisión Nacional de Paz en su fase transitoria’, 11 October 1991. Text of initial agreement of COPAZ: FBIS-LAT-91–201, pp. 17–19.
UN aide-memoir. Numbers in brackets indicate talking point numbers. There were 22 in all.
There at least one other person in the room, unidentified. Minutes, 16 October 1991.
PDC/UN, 3 December 1991. UN: ‘The main objective is the bring them to New York; if not, there will be no agreement. Aronson wants it, the FMLN wants it, the government, no.’
See ‘Peace march highlights divisions’, and Thomas Long,’ slow pace of talks puts Salvador truce onto shaky ground’, both in Miami Herald, 10 December 1991.
Escobar García was a retired colonel, Minister of Labor, and former Minister of Agriculture under Molina.
The meeting was held at Presidential House on 27 November 1991. Minutes do not reveal who the representatives of the embassies are. Source requested anonymity in using his notes of 8 December 1991.
Former Colombian President Belisario Betancur, former Venezuelan Foreign Minister Reinaldo Figuereido Planchart, and Thomas Burgenthal, Professor of Comparative Law and Jurisprudence at George Washington University and then-president of the Interamerican Institute of Human Rights.
‘Armando’ was then-vice president, later president, Calderón Sol.
On 25 December 1991 FMLN reported that ‘The GOES without Cristiani shows a very slim margin of maneuver and again emphasizes the limits of the Constitution’.
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© 1998 Tricia Juhn
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Juhn, T. (1998). A Conspiracy of Peace. In: Negotiating Peace in El Salvador. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26810-8_4
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