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Nuclear Deterrence Revisited

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Abstract

Deterrence is defined as the ‘act or process of deterring; especially the restraint and discouragement of crime by fear (as by the exemplary punishment of convicted offenders)’.1 In international politics deterrence is used as an instrument to convince other states that the use of violence is not appropriate or worthwhile.2 Nuclear deterrence is the threat of nuclear attack as retaliation, to prevent the opponent from using violence against the vital interests of the deterrer. The military doctrines of the Nuclear Weapon States are (still) based on this principle.

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Notes

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, USA

    Tom Sauer (Research Fellow)

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  1. Tom Sauer
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© 1998 Tom Sauer

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Sauer, T. (1998). Nuclear Deterrence Revisited. In: Nuclear Arms Control. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26729-3_1

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