The War in the Gulf

  • David Mervin


George Bush’s second year in office provided the two defining events of his presidency, the budget crisis and the war in the Gulf. The former was a leadership débâcle whereas the latter showed President Bush in a far more favourable light, particularly if the analysis is concentrated primarily, as it will be here, on the seven months between Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait at the beginning of August 1990 and the cease fire agreed at the end of Febuary 1991. During this critical period Bush’s foreign policy leadership is not easy to fault if it is measured simply by the fulfilment of goals. At an early stage the President decided that Iraq’s aggression had to be reversed and seven months later he presided over the triumphant achievement of that objective. On this occasion, far from being excessively cautious, Bush came across as a bold and resolute leader who kept his nerve in the face of many dangers and uncertainties.


Saudi Arabia National Security Security Council Security Council Resolution National Security Council 
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Copyright information

© David Mervin 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Mervin
    • 1
  1. 1.University of WarwickUK

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