Abstract
For the majority of this text we have confined our analysis to the study of a small open economy. By definition, the policy measures taken by such an economy have no significant impact upon its trading partners, and this makes it plausible to ignore possible reactions to its policies from the trading partners. In the real world, however, the actions taken by one country will often have significant effects upon trading partners, which means that countries are interdependent and policy measures adopted by one may provoke a reaction from trading partners that can reinforce, weaken or even offset its policy. Where such interdependence exists, it is frequently argued that countries should consider coordinating their macroeconomic policies to avert the possibility of conflict and improve their positions as compared to pursuing unilateral policies.
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Selected Further Readings
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© 1998 Keith Pilbeam
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Pilbeam, K. (1998). International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination. In: International Finance. Macmillan Texts in Economics. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26630-2_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26630-2_14
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