Post-Soviet Clientelist Norms at the Russian Federal Level

Abstract

Post-Soviet transition and efforts at democratisation have not lessened the importance of informal connections and extra legal arrangements to Russian political life. Indeed, the institutional and political confusion of the past half-decade has encouraged much informai manoeuvring among political elites. Political patronage continues to be a significant facet of post-Soviet reality. But the continuing transformation of the political system has altered the ways by which career connections and political networks function in the policy process. A Yeltsin patronage network, composed of long-term Sverdlovsk protégés and more recently recruited clients, has been influential in the post-Soviet Russian federal executive. Institutional sectoral interests have also become important actors in the negotiations over budgetary and other policy issues, and in contrast with the Soviet past, these actors can openly aggregate and articulate their own parochial interests. Indeed, as I will argue, established and resource- rich institutional actors now constitute important channels for mobility within the political elite.