Abstract
Conventionally, periods in American politics have been identified with American presidents — the Roosevelt era, the Kennedy—Johnson era, the Reagan era, and so on — rather than particular Congresses. These presidential labels are attached not only because of the prevailing presidentialism in American political science and history, but often because particular presidents are associated with detectable shifts in public policy. The events of 1995 and 1996 do not fit this pattern. As has often been the case in American government, the primary thrust for policy change came from Congress1 not from the White House. In the past, when Congress has sought to shift public policy in a new direction members have frequently sought also to adjust their chambers’ internal organisational arrangements so that they may better fulfil their policy needs and demands. When the 70 or so War Hawks elected to the 12th House in 1810 wanted to push President James Madison into waging war against Britain, they transformed the previously inert Speakership into the chamber’s political leader, augmented the office’s authority so as to rival the president, and elected Henry Clay as Speaker. Clay then used his new authority to appoint like-minded House members to committees and chairs in order to advance the new members’ policy agenda. In 1910, Progressive Republicans in the House wished to defeat the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill and curtail the power of their autocratic leader, Speaker ‘Uncle Joe’ Joseph G. Cannon (R.IL, 1903–11). Progressives combined with minority Democrats to strip Cannon of his power.
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Notes
On the role of Congress as a policy-maker, see Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1981; originally published 1885); Lawrence H. Chamberlain, The President, Congress and Legislation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946); Ronald C. Moe and Steven C. Teel, ‘Congress as Policymaker: A Necessary Reappraisal’, Political Science Quarterly, 85 (1970), pp. 443–70; Steven A. Shull, Domestic Policy Formation. Presidential-Congressional Partnership? (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983); John S. Saloma, Congress and the New Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy. The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968); Gary Orfield, Congressional Power: Congress and Social Change (New York: Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich, 1975); and Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994).
Whereas in 1969 less than half the Republican Conference could be classified as very conservative (CQ conservative coalition scores of 84 per cent or above), since 1989 over 70 per cent have fallen into this category. See also Nicol Rae, The Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans: From 1952 to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
Jacob Lamar, ‘An Attack Dog, Not a Lap Dog’, Time, 3 April 1989, p. 22.
William F. Connelly and John J. Pitney, Congress’ Permanent Minority? Republicans in the US House (Lanham, MD and London: Littlefield Adams, 1994), pp. 24–6, 62–4. For a conservative critique blaming Congress’s ‘irresponsible’ behaviour on increasingly ‘autonomous’ committees and subcommittees, see, for example, Clifford M. Hardin, Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry Weingast, Public Policy Excesses: Government by Congressional Subcommittee (St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, 1982), p. 5. The distinction between these competing models of congressional organisation is nicely drawn in Forrest Maltzman, ‘Committee-Chamber-Party Relations in the Post-Reform House’, a paper presented to the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 9–11 April 1992, pp. 2–3.
For a discussion of post-war debates on enhancing party government in Congress, see Charles O. Jones, Party and Policymaking: The House Republican Policy Committee (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964), especially Chapter II. For an elaboration of party government from a conservative perspective, see Gordon S. Jones and John A. Marini, eds., The Imperial Congress. Crisis in the Separation of Powers (New York: Pharos Books, 1988). From an older, liberal perspective, see E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1941); and Austin Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government (Urbana, IL: The University of Illinois Press, 1962).
John E. Owens, ‘The Return of Party Government in the US House of Representatives: Central Leadership Committee Relations in the 104th Congress’, British Journal of Political Science, 27/2 (April 1997), p. 361.
Most voters’ knew little of the Contract’s specific proposals. Moreover, in their 1994 election campaigns, many Republican candidates endorsed only particular parts of the Contract. See, for example, James G. Gimpel, Fulfilling the Contract. The First 100 Days (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), chapter 2; Elizabeth Drew, Showdown. The Struggle Between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton White House (New York and London: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 30.
Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., Intensive Care. How Congress Shapes Health Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
See, for example, John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy. Public Attitudes Toward American Political Institutions (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
This discussion is based on Michael Foley and John E. Owens, Congress and the Presidency: Institutional Politics in a Separated System (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press/St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 53, 67–73, 93–5. See also Barbara Sinclair, The Transformation of the US Senate (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1989), especially chapter 5; Alan Ehrenhart, ‘Every Man is an Island: In the Senate of the 1980s, Team Spirit Has Given Way to the Rule of Individuals’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 4 September, 1982, pp. 2175–82; Steven S. Smith, The American Congress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995), pp. 17–8; Burdett A. Loomis, The Contemporary Congress (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), chapters 2–4.
David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, ‘Consolidating Power in the House: The Rise of A New Oligarchy’, in idem, Congress Reconsidered. Fourth edition, pp. 39–64; Barbara Sinclair, ‘The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives’, Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), pp. 657–84; and John Barry, The Ambition and the Power (New York: Penguin Books, 1989).
Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House’, Ronald M. Peters, The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the US House (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Sinclair, ‘House Majority Leadership in the Late 1980s’; Sinclair, ‘The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives’; Barbara Sinclair, Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking. The US House of Representatives in the Postreform Era (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 189–92; Paul S. Herrnson and Kelly D. Patterson, ‘Toward a More Programmatic Democratic Party? Agenda-Setting and Coalition Building in the House of Representatives’, Polity, 27 (1995), pp. 607–28; and Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking. New Legislative Processes in the US Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997), especially chapter 6.
Roger H. Davidson, ‘Senate Leaders: Janitors for an Untidy Chamber’, in Dodd and Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered, third edition, pp. 225–52.
Donald C. Baumer, ‘Senate Democratic Leadership in the 101st Congress’, in Allen D. Hertzke and Ronald M. Peters, eds., The Atomistic Congress. An Interpretation of Congressional Change (Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), pp. 293–332, 305; Steven S. Smith, ‘Forces of Change in Senate Party Leadership and Organisation’, in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Congress Reconsidered, fifth edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), p. 274; and Foley and Owens, Congress and the Presidency, pp. 161–2.
Jeff Shear, ‘Force Majeure?’ National Journal, 11 March 1995, p. 602.
Janet Hook, ‘Conservative Freshman Class Eager to Seize the Moment’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 7 January 1995, p. 47.
Quoted in David S. Cloud, ‘Gingrich Clears Path for Republican Advance’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 19 November 1995, p. 3319.
The committee’s membership comprises all House Republican leaders, the chairs of the four most important committees (chosen by Gingrich), nine regional representatives and representatives of the two most recent Republican classes. Most of the votes on the old Committee on Committees were exercised by large state delegations such as those from California and Florida.
Moderates such as Jim Leach (R.IA), Nancy Johnson (R.CT), and Ben Gilman (R.NY) were nominated to the chairs of the Banking, Ethics, International Relations committees evidently because they had demonstrated energy, commitment and focus in advancing the party agenda before the elections. Leach and Johnson had also supported Gingrich in the Whip election in 1969.
Interviews were conducted by the author in June 1995.
Quoted in David S. Cloud, ‘Shakeup Time’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 25 March 1995, p. 10.
Over half the vacancies on ‘exclusive’ committees were given to newcomers — including three on Ways and Means (the first since 1966), seven on Appropriations (even though the committee membership was cut by four), eight on Commerce, one on Rules (the first since 1983), and five out of nine vacancies on Budget. In the case of Appropriations, however, committee chair Livingston admitted that ‘senior members weren’t eager to do the heavy lifting’ on cutting spending and so did not seek the assignment. Shear, ‘Force Majeure?’, p. 601.
Owens, ‘The Return of Party Government in the US House of Representatives’, p. 357.
According to data compiled by the House Oversight committee in March 1995, the number of committee staff positions fell from 1,854 positions in the 103rd Congress to 1,233 in the 104th — a fall of 33 per cent. Committee budgets fell from $222.3 to $156.3 millions. Most reductions were borne, however, by minority Democrats while Republicans retained or slightly increased the budgets they had previously operated under.
Rules committee data show that during the 104th Congress just under half (46 per cent) of rules were open compared with 33 per cent in the 103rd and 34 per cent in the 102nd Congress. Data provided by Don Wolfensberger, Chief of Staff, House Rules Committee and US. Congress. House. Rules Committee. Summary of Activities, 104th Congress, Second Session, Report No. 104–868, 26 November 1996. Democrats’ data show greater use of restrictive rules using slightly different measurement. They also argued that the percentage of open rules in the 104th House was inflated by granting open rules to non-controversial measures which might normally be considered under suspensions of the rules.
John E. Owens, ‘How Different Was the 104th House of Representatives? Change and Continuity in Floor Amendment Activity in the Era of Party Government’. A paper presented to the annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, New Orleans, 26–9 March 1997.
Although used very rarely in 1995, its use generated disquiet among members of committees affected, for example, in respect of a proposal to lift the moratorium on mining patents. See Elizabeth A. Palmer, ‘Empowering the Rank and File’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 22 July 1995, p. 2165.
The rules change continued to allow the Speaker to refer whole bills sequentially and parts of bills to other committees. Nine of 30 Contract bills were referred sequentially to at least one other committee, and one to as many as eight different committees. However, a smaller percentage (35 per cent) of leadership bills (including all the Contract bills) were multiply referred than in three of the four previous Houses. See Owens, ‘How Different Was the 104th House of Representatives?’, p. 12.
Steven S. Smith and Christopher J. Deering, Committees in Congress, second edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1990), p. 140.
Full committee chairs also lost the right to hold committee members’ proxy votes, to chair a subcommittee as well and to appoint their own (so-called 5-D) staff to subcommittees in addition to those appointed by subcommittee chairs.
Jonathan D. Salant, ‘New Chairmen Swing to the Right; Freshmen Get Choice Posts’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 10 December 1994, pp. 3493–4.
See, for example, the comments of Henry Waxman (D.CA), the former activist chair of the Commerce Committee’s Health and Environment Subcommittee, quoted in Jackie Koszczuk, ‘Gingrich Puts More Power into Speaker’s Hands’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 7 October 1995, p. 3052.
Thomas Rosenstiel, ‘Why Newt is No Joke’, Newsweek, 10 April 1995, p. 26.
Gabriel Kahn, ‘Hyde Battles Away on Judiciary Panel’, Roll Call, 20 February 1995, p. 15.
Rosenstiel, ‘Why Newt is No Joke’, p. 27.
Jennifer Babson, ‘Armey Stood Guard Over the Contract’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 8 April 1995, p. 987. Apparently in contrast, Gingrich insisted that the details of the Contract were subject to revision. See David S. Cloud, ‘House GOP Shows a United Front in Crossing “Contract” Divide’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 25 February 1995, p. 579.
See, for example, Sinclair, Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking, p. 163.
Details of this analysis are provided in Owens, ‘The Return of Party Government in the US House of Representatives’, pp. 360–5. A broader analysis of committee and chair success rates in winning approval of floor amendments is provided in Owens, ‘How Different Was the 104th House of Representatives?’, pp. 9–10. For a good journalistic account of leadership pressure on committee chairs, see David Maraniss and Michael Weisskopf, Tell Newt to Shut Up (New York: Touchstone, 1996).
Barbara Sinclair, ‘House Majority Party Leadership in an Era of Divided Control’, in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered. 5th edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), p. 239. ‘Major involvement’ defined by Sinclair as leadership participating in shaping the content of legislation by talking or negotiating with or among the committees (or with the Senate or the president) fell, however, to 54 per cent in the 102nd Congress.
Gabriel Kahn, ‘Even after Contract, House Chairs Take a Back Seat to the Leadership’, Roll Call, 21 September 1995, pp. 3 and 22.
‘The New(t) Politburo’, Roll Call, 9 October 1995, p. 4; Jon Healey, ‘Leader’s Last Minute Additions Offer Morsels For Everyone — Almost’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 5 August 1995, p. 2348.
According to a misdirected email written by a staffer for DeLay which reached House Democrats, Gingrich spelt out specific sanctions against the three dissidents: ‘Baker will be taken off [the committee] and put on Transportation. 2) Emerson (the second ranking Republican) will not become chairman if Roberts runs for the Senate. 3) Combest (the third ranking Republican) will be stripped of the Intelligence Committee chairmanship.’ See Craig Winneker, ‘Heard on the Hill’, Roll Call, 28 September 1995, p. 16. Subsequently, Gingrich assured these members that he had no intention of threatening them and offered to broker a compromise with Roberts.
Jackie Koszczuk, ‘Gingrich Puts More Power into Speaker’s Hands’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 7 October 1995, p. 3052.
Marcia Gelbart, ‘Threatened Committees Produce Little Legislation’, The Hill, 10 April 1996, p. 4.
Quoted in Gabriel Kahn, ‘Gingrich Plan: End to Panels?’ Roll Call, 9 October, 1995, p. 22. Gingrich subsequently stated that ‘[n]othing could be further from the truth … Rather than consolidating power in the leadership or funnelling it away from members, task forces actually allow for greater member participation.’ See Newt Gingrich, ‘Leadership Task Forces: The “Third Wave” To Consider Legislation’, Roll Call, 16 November, 1995, p. 5.
These included further enhancement of central leaders’ powers, stripping the Appropriations Committee of its power to set its own funding, Conference votes on subcommittee chairs ‘critical to the advancement of the majority’s legislative agenda in the House’, reductions in the numbers of subcommittees for certain committees, and the abolition of the Joint Economic Committee.
Another important change reflecting this approach was the abolition of 28 legislative service organisations (including the Congressional Black Caucus, the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, the Democratic Study Group and the Older American Caucus) which according to Republican detractors were ‘superfluous, wasteful and disorganised’.
Keith Krehbiel, ‘Where’s the Party?’, British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), pp. 235–66.
See Owens, ‘The Return of Party Government in the US House of Representatives’, pp. 372–3.
Allan Freedman, ‘Returning Power to Chairmen’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 23 November 1996, p. 3300.
See, for example, Nancy Gibbs, ‘The Inner Game’, Time, 15 January 1996; and Maraniss and Weisskopf, Tell Newt to Shut Up, chapter 11.
Following the resignation of Finance chair Bob Packwood from the Senate in September 1995, Dole ran out of options. Gramm won an assignment to the committee.
Quoted in Andrew Taylor, ‘House’s Magnum Opus Now Subject to Senate’s Tender Mercies’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1 April 1995, p. 913.
Quoted in David S. Cloud, ‘GOP Moderates Refusing to Get in Line’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 30 September 1995, p. 2963.
Whereas 42 per cent of Republican senators were elected from states in the South and West in 1973, by 1981 the percentage had risen to 51 per cent, and by 1995 to 55 per cent. Almost all were conservatives.
Quoted in Steve Langdon, ‘“Contract” Dwarfs Senate GOP’s Pledge’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 25 February 1995, p. 578.
Quoted in David S. Cloud, ‘Sanitarium Pushing Senate To Be More Like House’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 28 October 1995, p. 3255.
Mary Jacoby, ‘With Dole Away, Lott Wants to Play Leader’, Roll Call, 19 February 1996, pp. 1 and 40.
Richard E. Cohen, ‘Whipping the Senate GOP into Shape’, National Journal, 7 January 1995, p. 37.
David S. Cloud, ‘Lott Has Pole Position in “Race” for Leader’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 17 February 1995, p. 387.
Although Nickles denied any arrangement, he withdrew from the leadership race to run unopposed for Whip to replace Lott.
Richard E. Cohen, ‘Whipping the Senate GOP into Shape’, National Journal, 7 January 1995, p. 37.
Dole also voted against when he switched his vote in order to preserve his right to call for another vote on the same question.
Donna Cassata, ‘GOP Retreats on Hatfield, but War far from Over’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 11 March 1995, p. 729.
Cloud, ‘Santorum Pushing Senate to be More Like House’, p. 3256.
Mary Jacoby, ‘GOP Calls off Hatfield Fight’, Roll Call, 9 March 1995, p. 18.
Other task force members were Policy Committee chair, Don Nickles (R.OK), Bob Packwood (R.OR), Larry Craig (R.ID) and three freshman senators, Santorum, Fred Thompson (R.TN), John Kyl (R.AZ).
At the beginning of the 105th Senate, senior Republicans including Dominici (on Energy and Natural Resources), Lugar (on Foreign Relations), Helms (on Agriculture), Roth (on Governmental Affairs) and Thurmond (on Judiciary) lost subcommittee chairs. All 11 freshman/women Republicans elected in 1994 gained subcommittee chairs in 1997. Senator Fred Thompson (R.TN) even became full chair of the Governmental Affairs Committee.
However, in the rules eventually adopted by the Conference, it is not clear whether the votes on committee chairs occur before the establishment of the party’s legislative agenda.
Dick Morris, Behind the Oval Office. Winning the Presidency in the Nineties (New York: Random House, 1997), especially chapter 16.
On the 33 Contract bills, 61 per cent of House Republicans, including 73 per cent of freshmen/women, voted with a majority of their party on every vote. Donna Cassata, ‘Republicans Bask in Success of Rousing Performance’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 8 April 1995, p. 986.
Owens, ‘The Return of Party Government in the US House of Representatives’, pp. 361–5.
Congress will be able to pass bills to ‘disapprove’ of the president’s action, which presumably could then be vetoed by the president.
See, for example, Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking.
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Owens, J.E. (1998). Taking Power? Institutional Change in the House and Senate. In: McSweeney, D., Owens, J.E. (eds) The Republican Takeover of Congress. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26570-1_3
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