Abstract
In recent years, social scientists have become increasingly interested in the study of the political dimension of economic growth and development. Part of this interest can be found in the belief that traditional constructs have not been policy-relevant, especially since they usually fail to emphasize the importance of laws and institutions to economic growth. For example, the neo-classical economics model deals only with choice-through-markets, whereas its policy recommendations are usually implemented through non-market processes by a bureaucracy whose behaviour is not within the model. The state is treated as the ‘exogenous, omni-competent and costless instrument for the implementation of policies promoting “economic efficiency”’ (Wiseman, 1990, p. 105). In recent years, the public-choice model has emerged as a more intellectually satisfying approach to the study of public policy.
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Mbaku, J.M. (1998). Corruption and Rent-Seeking. In: Borner, S., Paldam, M. (eds) The Political Dimension of Economic Growth. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26284-7_10
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