Strategic Outlook: Compatibilities and Incompatibilities

  • Hanns W. Maull


This project started from a simple premise: a capacity for multilateral action is imperative to the protection of the Western countries' security. National security, in turn, we see as dependent on a mod-icum of international order and stability. Our premise rests on the observation that international relations have become so complex, power so diffuse and interdependence so intense that, as a general rule, only a pooling of resources and the sharing of risks and responsibilities will be able to shape events or 'control outcomes' — as one key definition of power has it. An effective exercise of national power to enhance security and deflect threats will certainly require cooperation with other states, and, most probably, with international organizations. Moreover, with the evolution of interna-tional society has come a stronger sense of legitimacy. The exercise of national power therefore will often require legitimation through a collective security body: the United Nations or, in Europe, the OSCE.


Foreign Policy International Relation Security Council Security Policy National Interest 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1998

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  • Hanns W. Maull

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