Skip to main content

Deficits, Debt and European Monetary Union: Some Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic

  • Chapter
The Debt Burden and its Consequences for Monetary Policy

Abstract

There is now a rapidly growing literature dealing with the relationship between fiscal and monetary policies in complete or incomplete monetary unions.2 Much of this literature is a reaction to the Delors Report and to the Maastricht Treaty. The Report suggested and the Treaty institutionalized binding fiscal rules for monetary convergence. Since then these rules have been intensively debated. Many authors regard them as superfluous or as arbitrarily fixed.

We thank Rudiger Dornbusch, Jürgen von Hagen, Assaf Razin and other conference participants for helpful comments. Suggestions by Franz X. Hof were highly appreciated. We owe the subtitle to Mervyn King who introduced this twist to Sargent’s term ‘unpleasant monetarist arithmetic’ in King (1995)

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Bishop, G. (1992). ‘The EC’s Public Debt Disease: Discipline with Credit Spreads and Cure with Price Stability’, in Fair, D. E. and de Boissieu, C. (eds) Fiscal Policy, Taxation and the Financial System in an Increasingly Integrated Europe (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster Kluwer Academic Publishers), pp. 207–34.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Blanchard, O. H. (1984) ‘Current and Anticipated Deficits, Interest Rates and Economic Activity,’ European Economic Review, vol. 25, pp. 7–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bovenberg, A. L., Kremers, J. J. M. and Masson, P. R. (1991) ‘Economic and Monetary Union in Europe and Constraints on National Budgetary Policies’, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, vol. 38, pp. 374–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buiter, W., Corsetti, G. and Roubini, N. (1993) ‘Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht’, Economic Policy, vol. 16, April, pp. 58–90; followed by a discussion by Repullo, R. and Frankel, J.

    Google Scholar 

  • Darby, M. R. (1984) ‘Some Pleasant Monetarist Arithmetic’, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, vol. 8, Spring, pp. 15–20; reprinted (1985) vol. 9, Winter, followed by a reply by Miller P. J. and Sargent, T. J.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eichengreen, B., Frieden, J. and von Hagen, J. (eds) (1995) Monetary and Fiscal Policy in an Integrated Europe (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Verlag).

    Google Scholar 

  • Fratianni, M. and von Hagen J. (1993) European Monetary Union and Central Bank Independence’, Regional Science and Urban Economics, vol. 23, pp. 401–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hochreiter, E., Rovelli, R., and Winckler, G. (1996) ‘Central Banks and Seigniorage: A Study of Three Economies in Transition’, European Economic Review, vol. 40, pp. 629–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • King, M. (1995) ‘Commentary: Monetary Policy Implications of Greater Fiscal Discipline’, in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (ed.), Budget Deficits and Debt. Issues and Options, pp. 171–83.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kugler, P. and Neusser, K.(1993) ‘International Real Interest Rate Equalization’, Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 8, pp. 163–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lane, T. and Prati, A. (1995) ‘Does High Public Debt Constrain Monetary Policy? Some Tests of Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetiic’; paper presented at lEA, 11th World Congress, Tunis; unpublished paper, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, USA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nelson, C. R. and Siegel, A. F. (1987) ‘Parsimonious Modeling of Yield Curves’, Journal of Business, vol. 60, pp. 473–89.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Obstfeld, M. (1995) ‘International Capital Mobility in the 1990s’, in Kenen, P.B. (ed.) Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 201–61.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rovelli, R. (1994) ‘Reserve Requirements, Seigniorage and Financing of the Government in an Economic and Monetary Union’, European Economy, Notes and Reports, no. 1, pp. 11–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Repullo, R. (1992) ‘Financing Budget Deficits by Seigniorage and Implicit Taxation: The Cases of Spain and Portugal’, in Fair, D. E. and de Boissieu, C. (eds) Fiscal Policy, Taxation and the Financial System in an Increasingly Integrated Europe. (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Kluwer, Academic Publishers), pp. 235–53.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Sargent, T. J. and Wallace, N. (1981) ‘Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic’, Quarterly Review, vol. 5, (Fall), Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA, pp. 1–17. Reprinted (1985) vol. 9, (Winter), pp. 15–31. See also Sargent (1986), ch. 5, pp. 158–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sargent, T. J. (1986) Rational Expectations and Inflation (New York: Harper & Row).

    Google Scholar 

  • Spaventa, L. (1992) ‘The Italian Public Debt Problem’, in Fair, D. E. and de Boissieu, C. (eds) Fiscal Policy, Taxation and the Financial System in an Increasingly Integrated Europe (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Kluwer Academic Publishers), pp. 185–205.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Tanzi, V. (1985) ‘Fiscal Deficits and Interest Rates in the United States, an Empirical Analysis’, International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers vol. 32, (December), pp. 1060–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Additional References

  • Alesina, A. and Drazen, A. (1991) ‘Why are Stabilizations Delayed?’, American Economic Review, vol. 81, pp. 1170–88.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dornbusch, R. (1997) ‘Debt and Monetary Policy: The Policy Issues’, this volume, pp. 3–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • von Hagen, J. and Eichengreen, B. (1996) ‘Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union’, American Economic Review, vol. 86, May, pp. 134–8.

    Google Scholar 

  • von Hagen, J. and Harden, I. J. (1994) ‘National Budget Processes and Fiscal Performance’, European Economy, Reports and Studies, vol. 3, pp. 311–418.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weingast, B. (1996) ‘The Political Foundations of Limited Government: Parliament and Sovereign Debt in 17th and 18th Century England’, in Nye J. V. C. and Drobak, J. N. (eds) Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics (New York: Academic Press).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 1998 International Economic Association

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Winckler, G., Hochreiter, E., Brandner, P. (1998). Deficits, Debt and European Monetary Union: Some Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic. In: Calvo, G., King, M. (eds) The Debt Burden and its Consequences for Monetary Policy. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26077-5_10

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics