NATO’s Double Enlargement: New Tasks, New Members

  • Ronald D. Asmus


The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is perhaps the most successful alliance in history, but it faces a growing paradox. On the one hand, hardly a week passes without senior officials in the US and Europe lauding its importance. The Alliance has become involved in peace implementation in Bosnia and is preparing to embrace the new democracies in East-Central Europe. Even Paris, Washington’s old nemesis in the struggle for leadership in Europe, has abandoned its traditional Gaullist aspirations of an independent European defence and shifted gears to become more deeply engaged.


European Union North Atlantic Treaty Organization Vital Interest European Security Double Enlargement 
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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1997

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  • Ronald D. Asmus

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