The Securities and Exchange Commission and the publicly-held company: An overview of the US regulatory system

  • Harvey L. Pitt
Part of the Studies in Regulation book series (STUDREG)


In 1831, two young Frenchmen were sent by their Minister of the Interior to conduct a survey of prisons in the United States. The men used the opportunity to travel for almost a year throughout that young country, and the recorded observations of one of them, Alexis de Tocqueville, would later be collected in a work called Democracy in America that to this day is studied for its remarkably prescient insights into the American people and their system of government.


Corporate Governance Supra Note Institutional Investor Wall Street Journal Security Market 
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© The Regulatory Policy Institute 1997

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  • Harvey L. Pitt

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