Abstract
Sen (1986) concludes his classical survey of social choice theory by stressing the great variety of problems addressed by the discipline. As he writes (p. 1129), ‘the questions “what is best for society?” and “what is best for me?” are different ones, even though they are clearly interrelated’ and methods for aggregating answers to the first kind of question may differ from those used for the other kind of question.
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Additional References
Fleurbaey, M. (1995) ‘Equality and Responsibility’, European Economic Review, vol. 39, pp. 683–9.
Fleurbaey, M. and Maniquet, F. (1996) ‘Fair Allocation with Unequal Production Skills: The No-Envy Approach to Compensation’, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 32, pp. 71–93.
Moulin, H. (1995) Cooperative Microeconomics (New York: Prentice-Hall).
Sacco, P. L. and Zamagni, S. (1994) ‘An Evolutionary Dynamic Approach to Altruism’, mimeo, Economics Department, University of Bologna.
Sen, A. K. (1986) ‘Social Choice Theory’, in Arrow, K. J. and Intriligator, M. D. (eds), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, Vol. III (Amsterdam: North-Holland).
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© 1997 International Economic Association
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Gevers, L. (1997). Discussion of Sen’s Paper. In: Arrow, K.J., Sen, A., Suzumura, K. (eds) Social Choice Re-examined. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25849-9_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25849-9_4
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