From Crisis to Crisis

Abstract

The scuttling of the Paris summit was followed in short order by the final rupture with China. Mao Zedong had watched with pleasure as the U-2 crisis disrupted the best-laid plans of both Eisenhower and Khrushchev; from Mao’s perspective, Khrushchev had gotten what he deserved for entering into such a close relationship with the leader of the imperialist camp. The stiffening of Soviet policy towards the West which followed the summit did nothing to repair the breach in Sino-Soviet relations; on the contrary, China stepped up its criticism of the Soviet Union, and Moscow responded in kind.² Bitter exchanges at a Romanian party congress in Bucharest later in the month led to the withdrawal of Soviet specialists from China, which thenceforth received no Soviet economic assistance.³ Beijing responded by cancelling trade agreements with Czechoslovakia, Moscow’s loyal client, and the Soviets were compelled to purchase Czechoslovak goods which had been earmarked for China.⁴

He who thinks that he can charm the workers with nice revolutionary phrases is mistaken. . . . If one does not show concern for the growth of material and spiritual wealth, then people will listen today, they will listen tomorrow, and then they will say: ‘Why do you always promise us everything in the future, talking, so to speak, about life beyond the grave? The priest has already talked to us about that.’

N. S. Khrushchev, Moscow, 1964¹