The Notion of Trust in Philosophical Psychology
Trust does not fall neatly into the traditional categories of the philosophy of mind. Perhaps this is why it has not been a favourite topic of professional philosophers. Of course, this could as well be a reason why one should be interested. Admittedly, the times are changing;1 but there still seems to be a lot of confusion about how to fit trust into a more general account of human action.
KeywordsMental State Philosophical Investigation Real Pattern Favourite Topic Professional Philosopher
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- 2.Something like this seems to be a usual view ranging from Hobbes to modern writers. See John Dunn, ‘Trust and Political Agency’, 74; Thomas Hobbes, ‘Human Nature’, in The Moral and Political Writings of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury , quoted in Dunn, loc. cit., Patrick Bateson, ‘The Biological Evolution of Cooperation and Trust’, 15; Diego Gambetta, ‘Can We Trust Trust?’, 230. Baier, too, refers to at least some type of trust as a ‘mental phenomenon’, ‘Trust and Antitrust’, 235. To these writers one may add all those who characterize trust as a belief or an assumption, in so far as they accept a rather wide-spread characterization of all beliefs and assumptions as mental states.Google Scholar