Abstract
Philosophers of action in the analytic tradition have not paid much attention to social agency — that is, to actions performed not by individual persons but by social groups of various kinds. Discussion has centred on what individual agents do or intend and on the reasons each has for acting. The standard assumption has been that there can be actions only where there are basic actions — actions one does not do by doing something -construed as ways in which we move our bodies. Since each of us has a distinct body and moving it as a basic action is something we all do on our own, there can be no basic actions which are social. The hope is to show how social actions can be derived from basic actions, but analysis seldom gets that far.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1997 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Stoutland, F. (1997). Why are Philosophers of Action so Anti-Social?. In: Alanen, L., Heinämaa, S., Wallgren, T. (eds) Commonality and Particularity in Ethics. Swansea Studies in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25602-0_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25602-0_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-25604-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-25602-0
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)