Abstract
The literature on international security tends to reflect issues topical at the time it is written. This has clearly been the case with the debate on common security. The concept arose out of concerns with the nature and direction of world politics as they appeared during the Cold War. Common security was presented as a way of moving beyond a world dominated by the arms race and towards an alternative world which would be marked by states, and peoples, recognising their common interests in survival and peaceful development. In time, aspects of this message became integrated into mainstream thought, sometimes in the guise of cooperative security.2 To show how this occurred, and to illuminate some of the consequences, it is first necessary to step back in history, to a period when policies which hinged on the threat of nuclear catastrophe were seen, in rather stark terms, to partly define the structure and workings of the international system.
Large parts of this chapter are drawn from Andrew Butfoy, Recasting Common Security (Canberra: ANU, Department of International Relations, Working Paper 1995/8, 1995).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
The literature on common and cooperative security is often vague on the precise relationship between the two terms. Sometimes they are treated synonymously, at other times they are viewed as quite different; mostly they are given extremely vague meanings which offer considerable latitude in interpretation. In this study cooperative security is seen as a concept which, in principle, encompasses many but not all of the concerns found in the debate on common security. A convenient way of looking at the issue is to see cooperative security as a contemporary, relatively conservative, variant of common security. The relationship between these terms is explored in more depth during the course of the study. The recent wave of literature advocating common security is usually traced back to the 1982 publication of the Report of The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982);
this Report is normally — and hereafter — referred to as the Palme Commission, after its chairman, Olof Palme. For a more contemporary overview of the definitional issue, especially as it impacts on the Asia-Pacific region, see Geoffrey Wiseman, ‘Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region’, The Pacific Review 5:1 (1992), pp. 42–59,
and David Dewitt, ‘Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security’, The Pacific Review, 7:1 (1994), pp. 1–15. As Dewitt notes, some notions of cooperative security are ‘broadly similar’ to ideas of common security; further, he adds that ‘any attempt to differentiate between them runs the risk of drawing artificial boundaries’ (p. 1). To see how treatments of common and cooperative security have been intermingled,
see David Dewitt, ‘Introduction: The New Global Order and the Challenges of International Security’, in David Dewitt, David Haglund and John Kirton, Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993);
and Kim Nossal, ‘Seeing Things? The Adornment of Security in Australia and Canada’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 49:1 (May 1995), pp. 33–47. For a discussion of cooperative security in its European context,
see Stuart Croft, ‘Cooperative Security in Europe’, Brassey’s Defence Yearbook 1993 (London: Brassey’s, 1993), pp. 101–16. For a relatively conservative version of common security,
see Stan Windass and Eric Grove, The Crucible of Peace: Common Security in Europe (London: Brassey’s, 1988).
For a sketch of earlier antecedents of common security thinking, see Geoffrey Wiseman, Common Security and Non-Provocative Defence: Alternative Approaches to the Security Dilemma (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, ANU, 1989). For a less Euro-centric and more recent discussion, see Dewitt, ‘Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security’. Dewitt begins his paper with a discussion of the Japanese idea of comprehensive security developed in the 1970s; this idea stressed the multi-dimensional nature of Tokyo’s security concerns; this encompassed territorial defence, cooperation with the US, and secure supplies of energy and food, etc. The focus in this concept was on national well-being — not, as is the case in most notions of common security, on reforming international relations.
See, for example, Emma Rothschild, ‘Common Security’, SIPRI Yearbook 1984 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1984), pp. 583–90.
Palme Commission, p. 177. This objective was, however, more or less rejected in some relatively conservative notions of common security. See Barry Buzan, ‘Common Security as a Policy Option for Japan and Western Europe’, in Radmila Nakarada and Jan Oberg, Surviving Together: The Olof Palme Lectures on Common Security 1988 (Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishing Company/Gower Publishing Group, 1989). Buzan argued that strategic nuclear weapons fall ‘within the logic of common security’ (since their role is retaliatory), and that ‘Japan would need to moderate its extreme anti-military posture’ (p. 75). In contrast, another writer in the same book argues that ‘Deterrence by threat of retaliation — in particular, by threat of nuclear extinction — is something which itself makes the world more dangerous See Sverre Lodgaard, ‘Europe in the Aftermath of INF: Political Order and Military Deterrence’, p. 103. Lodgaard continues: by enhancing enmities and creating fear nuclear deterrence influences... politics in ways which can only increase the danger of war. It nurtures perceptions of inhuman, aggressive adversaries worthy of total extinction.... It encourages and legitimates military confrontation rather than political cooperation... deterrence is... a state that should be transcended... (p. 104).
To get a sense of some of the signals coming out of the US at this time, see Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 1982). For an example of the sort of thinking on the issue which worried many people,
see Colin Gray, ‘Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory’, International Security, 4:1 (Summer 1979), pp. 54–87. Even many supporters of NATO, including many believers in deterrence, suspected that the West was too dependent on nuclear weapons;
see, for example, John Steinbruner and Leon Sigal (eds), Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1983). For an analysis of NATO’s Cold War ‘nuclear addiction’,
see David Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1983).
Such suspicions were fuelled by studies calling for enormously expensive ‘deep-strike’ conventional weapons programmes; see, for example, the European Security Study (ESECS), Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe (London: Macmillan, 1983).
See, for example, Barry Buzan, ‘Common Security, Non-Provocative Defence, and the Future of Western Europe’, Review of International Studies, 13 (1987), pp. 265–79.
For surveys of the debate on non-offensive defence in Europe during the 1980s, see Horst Afheldt et al., ‘A New European Defense’ — Special Edition of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1988;
J. Dean, ‘Alternative Defence: Answer to NATO’s Central Front Problems?’ International Affairs, 64:1 (Winter 1987/88), pp. 61–82;
and Stan Windass (ed.), Avoiding Nuclear War: Common Security as a Strategy for the Defence of the West (London: Brassey’s, 1985).
For example, see Ken Booth, New Thinking about Strategy and International Security (London: HarperCollins Academic, 1991), especially the Introduction and Conclusion.
Two of the most prominent representations of these approaches are (for Neo-Realism) Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley, 1979) and (for classical Realism)
E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1939).
For critiques of Realism, see, for example: the various chapters in Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986);
Richard Lebow, ‘The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism’, International Organisation, 48:2 (Spring 1994), pp. 249–77;
and Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organisation, 46:2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391–425.
For a case in point, see John Mearsheimer, ‘The Case for a Ukranian Nuclear Deterrent’, Foreign Affairs, 72:3 (Summer 1993), pp. 50–66. On the theme of Realist analysis helping to produce a quasi-Realist world,
see Andrew Butfoy, ‘Rationalising the Bomb? Strategic Studies and the US Nuclear Umbrella’, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 40:2 (1994), pp. 145–61;
and Michael MccGwire, ‘Deterrence: the Problem — Not the Solution’, International Affairs, 62:1 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 55–70.
Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (New York: Greenwood Press, 1957).
The sort of argument just presented would probably be accepted by most non-Realists. However, in its contemporary form it derives from a relatively narrow school of thought which has a good deal in common with Realism. For an examination of the relationship between Realism and the issue of relative/absolute gains, see, for example, Robert Keohane, ‘Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War’, in David Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). As Keohane notes, both Realists and proponents of absolute gains base their argument on a picture of international relations which is driven by states calculating ways of maximising self-interest. The key difference is that the latter group, ‘argues that where common interests exist, realism is too pessimistic about the prospects for cooperation and the role of institutions’ (p. 277).
See, for example: Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’, International Security, 20:1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71–81; Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’;
Elizabeth Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars’, International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65–93.
See Ken Booth, ‘Steps Towards Stable Peace in Europe: A Theory and Practice of Coexistence’, International Affairs, 66:1 (1990), pp. 17–45.
See, for example: Kenneth Dadzie, ‘Report on the Discussions in Working Group IV: Common Security and the Third World’, in SIPRI, Policies for Common Security (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985);
Joseph Rotblat and Vitalii Goldanskii (eds), Global Problems and Common Security (Berlin: Pugwash-Springer-Verlag, 1989);
and Joseph Rotblat and Laszlo Valki (eds), Coexistence, Cooperation, and Common Security (London: Macmillan, 1988).
See Gary Smith and St John Kettle (eds), Threats Without Enemies: Rethinking Australia’s Security (Leichhardt: Pluto Press, 1992); the point about the relevance of domestic violence and children’s toys is made in the chapter by Di Bretherton, ‘Towards a Secure Community’.
Palme Commission, especially Chapter 4 (e.g. p. 96); in addition, see p. 130, ‘Peace and prosperity are two sides of the same coin’. A similar point seems to be implied by Gareth Evans, see ‘Cooperative Security and Interstate Conflict’, Foreign Policy, 96 (Fall 1994), p. 11.
Werner Feld, The Future of European Security and Defence Policy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p. 69.
See Anthony Smith, ‘Towards a Global Culture?’, in Mike Featherstone (ed.), Global Culture, Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity (London: Sage, 1991). There is, however, considerable room for international dialogue along common security lines even in a fragmented world:
see Richard Shapcott, ‘Conversation and Coexistence: Gadamer and the Interpretation of International Society’, Millennium, 23:1 (Spring 1994), pp. 57–83.
A point well made by John Keegan in A History of Warfare (London: Pimlico, 1993).
Bjorn Moller, Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense: A Neo-Realist Perspective (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 179.
Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 21. Buzan continues (p. 22): Anarchy can be seen fatalistically as a product of history... or the natural political expression of a... diverse population. It can also be seen as a preferred form of political order, representing values of ideological and cultural diversity, economic decentralisation and political independence and self-reliance.
See Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘Address to the UN’ (press release, Novosti Press Agency, December 1988). For a discussion of the context for the shift in Soviet policy, see Michael Cox, ‘Whatever happened to the “Second” Cold War? Soviet-American relations: 1980–1988’, Review of International Studies, 16 (1990), pp. 155–72.
But, for a relatively radical exposition of cooperative security which shared a good deal with earlier discussions on common security, see Randall Forsberg, ‘Creating a Cooperative Security System’, in Forsberg et al., ‘After the Cold War: A Debate on Cooperative Security’, Boston Review, 17:6 (1992).
For a discussion of Australia’s efforts to establish a place in regional cooperative security activities, see Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s (Canberra: Allen and Unwin, 1996).
This debate occurred within the context of different perceptions of the dominant forces at work in the region and the consequent prospects for peace. For example, see Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, ‘Rethinking East Asian Security’, Survival (Summer 1994), pp. 3–21; James Richardson, ‘Asia-Pacific: The Case for Geopolitical Optimism’, The National Interest, 38 (Winter 1994/5), pp. 28–39; and the related correspondence in Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995), pp. 184–7.
For discussions of regional approaches here, see Dewitt, ‘Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security’; Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr, ‘The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific’, The Washington Quarterly, 18:1 (Winter 1995), pp. 123–40; and Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s.
Like its relatives, the term cooperative security has been used in a diverse and contradictory way; on this point refer to note 2. My benchmark for the following discussion is three major contributions to the literature: Dewitt, ‘Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security’; Janne Nolan (ed.), Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994);
and Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993). For a less state-centric conception of cooperative security see Evans, ‘Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict’. For an attempt to ‘bring in’ common security thinking into the debate on cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific region, see Mack and Kerr, ‘The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific’. For an earlier and more conservative definition of cooperative security in its European context, see Windass and Grove, The Crucible of Peace, pp. 10–11.
Evans, Cooperating for Peace, p. 16. Evans also includes the notion of ‘comprehensive security’ within his idea of cooperative security. For a sketch of some of the differences and overlap between these various concepts, see Andrew Mack, Concepts of Security in the Post-Cold War (Canberra: ANU Department of International Relations, Working Paper 1993/8).
For a discussion of the relationship between society and system in this context, see Barry Buzan, ‘From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School’, International Organisation, 47:3 (Summer 1993), pp. 327–52.
See, for example, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977).
For a seminal text, see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977).
Buzan, ‘From International System to International Society’. For a further discussion of the relationship between these two branches of international relations scholarship, see Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, ‘Regime Theory and the English School: A Comparison’, Millennium, 21:3 (1992), pp. 329–51.
Some contemporary schemes for world government are breathtaking in their sweep, Utopianism and silliness. Errol Harris argues that it is essential to establish immediately a form of world authority that can legislate globally and enforce world law on individuals without resort to warfare. The necessary and sufficient conditions for world federation are... at hand. Needless to say, a degree of consciousness-raising would be required, notwithstanding the last part of the quote; after all: ‘All that remains to be done is to persuade the peoples of the world’! See Harris, One World or None: Prescription for Survival (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), pp. x, 83. It must be said, however, that few proponents of common security would be drawn into quite this degree of irrelevance.
Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, International Organisations, 36:2 (1982), p. 357.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1997 Andrew Butfoy
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Butfoy, A. (1997). Common Security. In: Common Security and Strategic Reform. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25531-3_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25531-3_1
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-25533-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-25531-3
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)