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Domestic Constraints and Japan’s Emerging International Role

  • Kent E. Calder
Part of the St Antony’s Series book series

Abstract

In view of global trade and current-account imbalances, unprecedented in post-war history, dramatic instability in world financial markets, and a surge of protectionist trade proposals across the industrialised West, pessimism has steadily risen regarding the long-run prospects for a liberal and open international economic order. Historically, liberal trade and monetary regimes have prevailed in the international economy only on two occasions, when there has been a clear hegemonic or dominant power — Britain from the Napoleonic Wars through the First World War and the United States since the Second World War. Yet with the United States heavily in debt to the rest of the world and carrying an annual fiscal deficit that has spiralled as high as $400 billion in the recent past,’ American capacity to dictate and defend rules of the international system, to offer the dollar credibly as key currency, to open its market broadly to imports, and to discharge other functions of hegemony is coming increasingly into question.

Keywords

Direct Foreign Investment Liberal Democratic Party International Role External Asset Japanese Direct Foreign Investment 
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Notes

  1. 8.
    See for example, Charles Kindleberger, Power and Money: The Economics of International Politics and the Politics of International Economics, New York, Basic Books, 1970;Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kent E. Calder

There are no affiliations available

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