Employment Contracts, Finance and the Distribution of Wealth
Given technology, preferences and information, which manner of organizing production will survive in a competitive environment? Is hierarchy with monitors and employees a necessary outcome of efficient contracting, or are there conditions under which other organizational forms (such as partnerships) might be viable? In answering these questions, one must take into account the free entry of agents into the different occupations — for example, entrepreneur, manager, employee, partner — that each type of organization entails; the factors which determine occupational choice also affect the competitive selection of organizational form.
KeywordsCapital Market Agency Cost Excess Demand Employment Relation Employment Contract
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