Abstract
Churchill’s Government inherited from Attlee’s the commitment to support the United Nations Command in Korea, but this was not like one of the joint commands of the Second World War. The British contribution was relatively small in relation to the Command as a whole, which had been entrusted in the first instance to the United States, originally in the person of General Douglas MacArthur. When so-called Chinese volunteers intervened in the struggle in November 1950, MacArthur’s troops had suffered a severe reverse, for they were scattered across North Korea attempting to clear the whole country of the enemy. President Truman and the American Chiefs of Staff accepted that honour would be satisfied if the United Nations forces re-established a position near the 38th Parallel, which had been the original border between North and South Korea. As we have seen, however, MacArthur wanted to go further, openly demanding authority to strike directly at China, and expressing pessimism about the prospects in Korea unless this were done. In April 1951 Truman relieved him of the command, and transferred it to his Army Commander, General Matthew Ridgway.
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© 1997 Henry Pelling
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Pelling, H. (1997). Korea and Colonial Problems. In: Churchill’s Peacetime Ministry, 1951–55. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25283-1_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25283-1_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-67709-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-25283-1
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