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Privatization and The Ownership Structure of Public Utilities

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Part of the Central Issues in Contemporary Economic Theory and Policy book series (CICETP)

Abstract

This study analyzes some of the issues related to the ownership structure of public utilities in the process of being privatized. Firstly it examines how the structure of the market influences ownership. Secondly it examines the effects of the state as a regulator or a stockholder, though no longer sole owner.

Keywords

Corporate Governance Privatize Company Ownership Structure Agency Cost Public Utility 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Servizio Italiano Pubblicazioni Internazionali Srl 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Italian TreasuryRomaItaly
  2. 2.CONSOBRomaItaly

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