The Road Since Structure

  • Thomas S. Kuhn
Part of the Main Trends of the Modern World book series (MTMW)


On this occasion, and in this place, I feel that I ought, and am probably expected, to look back at the things which have happened to the philosophy of science since I first began to take an interest in it over half a century ago. But I am both too much an outsider and too much a protagonist to undertake that assignment. Rather than attempt to situate the present state of philosophy of science with respect to its past — a subject on which I’ve little authority — I shall try to situate my present state in philosophy of science with respect to its own past — a subject on which, however imperfect, I’m probably the best authority there is.


Scientific Development Knowledge Claim Language Game Speech Community Correspondence Theory 
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Copyright information

© Philosophy of Science Association 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas S. Kuhn

There are no affiliations available

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