Abstract
In his paper Peter Hammond suggests an ingenious formal model — the multivalued game form — as a tool for modelling rights. While the traditional method of modelling rights using social choice rules has been criticized and game forms have been suggested as a superior alternative, Hammond’s construct has the advantage of including both the traditional social choice models and game forms as special cases. I will argue below that this is not enough. Such a formal generalization may be neither necessary nor sufficient. To answer significant questions about rights and their role in social decision-making we need to go a step further. We need a model which is rich enough to allow simultaneously for the intuitive ethical considerations which underlie traditional social choice and game form models of rights.
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Additional References
Hurwicz, L. (1994) ‘How do Institutions Differ from Mechanisms?’, paper presented at the Second International Conference of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Rochester, USA.
Sen, A. K. (1997) ‘Individual Preference as the Basis of Social Choice’, in Arrow, K. J. et al. (eds), Social Choice Re-examined, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan).
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© 1996 International Economic Association
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Deb, R. (1996). Discussion of Hammond’s Paper. In: Arrow, K.J., Sen, A., Suzumura, K. (eds) Social Choice Re-Examined. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25214-5_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25214-5_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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