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Abstract

As the new world order emerges from the Cold War, Russia’s detente with China is one of the least remarked of a number of important developments of the past decade, yet it is arguably one of the most important. It is the thesis of this chapter that in the context of major change in American strategy, Russo-Chinese cooperation could be the engine of positive fundamental, structural change in Eurasia, but Russo-Chinese competition could, on the other hand, lead to the renewal of conflict on the Korean peninsula.

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Notes

  1. Peter Schweizer, Victory, The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. 6 et passim.Russo-Chinese Detente and the Emerging New World Order 237

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  2. James M. McConnell, ‘SDI, the Soviet Investment Debate and Soviet Military Policy,’ Strategic Review, Winter 1988, pp. 47–61.

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  3. For an elucidation of this crucial point, see Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr., The Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1990), especially the chapters by Anders Aslund and Daniel Epstein.

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  4. For a revealing account of this shift, see George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years As Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1993), especially Chapter 41, ‘Breaking Through to the Soviets,’ pp. 879–900.

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  5. Jeffrey Gedmin, The Hidden Hand: Gorbachev and the Collapse of East Germany (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1992).

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  6. For an account of Deng’s delaying tactics, see A. Doak Barnett, US Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986).

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  7. For a discussion of the initial effects of economic reform under Deng, see Nicholas Lardy, China’s Entry Into The World Economy (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1986), p. 38ff.

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  8. A senior Chinese official, Chen Yizi, who defected to the West after the Tienanmen incident, has confirmed the occurrence of this debate. See Jim Hoagland, ‘Senior Chinese Official Who Fled Emerges From Hiding,’ The Washington Post, September 4, 1989, p. Al.

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  9. For a useful discussion of Chinese relations with North Korea, see Yong-Sup Han, ‘China’s Leverage Over North Korea,’ Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1994, pp. 233–49.

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  10. For a concise analysis of North Korea, see Yossef Bodansky, Crisis In Korea - The Emergence of a New and Dangerous Nuclear Power (New York: SPI Books, 1994).

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© 1997 Hafeez Malik

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Thornton, R.C. (1997). Russo-Chinese Detente and the Emerging New World Order. In: Malik, H. (eds) The Roles of the United States, Russia and China in the New World Order. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25189-6_9

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