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Issues and Results in General Equilibrium Theory

  • Beth Allen
Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)

Abstract

My assignment here is very broad: to discuss general equilibrium theory. However, rather than attempting a general survey of this topic, I will focus selectively, with varying degrees of emphasis, on the current research areas that I consider most interesting and fruitful to pursue.

Keywords

General Equilibrium Cooperative Game Competitive Equilibrium Market Game Incentive Compatibility Constraint 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Economics Association 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Beth Allen
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of MinneapolisMinneapolisUSA

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