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Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information

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Economics in a Changing World

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

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Abstract

A mechanism is the procedure through which actions of various individuals result in an outcome. Mechanism design theory studies the relationship between alternative procedures and the outcomes that result. This chapter describes some of the theoretical progress that has been made in the study of mechanism design when there is incomplete information about the preferences of the individuals. It is expository in nature and is not intended to be a survey.1

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA

    Sanjay Srivastava

Authors
  1. Sanjay Srivastava
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA

    Beth Allen

  2. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA

    Beth Allen

Copyright information

© 1996 International Economics Association

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Cite this chapter

Srivastava, S. (1996). Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information. In: Allen, B. (eds) Economics in a Changing World. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25168-1_6

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