Abstract
My mother, like most mothers, was fond of the question: Suppose everybody behaved liked that? Her logic was the same as Spinoza’s (1674) in the quotation from his Tractatus Politicus that heads this chapter. Since things would be bad for everybody if everybody behaved selfishly, selfishness must therefore be irrational. Rousseau (1762) argues similarly in his Inequality of Man when telling the famous stag-hunt tale.2 However, Kant (1785) is the most famous pedlar of the fallacy. As his categorical imperative puts it: Act only on the maxim that you would at the same time will to be a universal law.
What if a man could save himself from the present danger of death by treachery? If reason should recommend that, it would recommend it to all men.
(Benedict de Spinoza)
This paper is condensed from chapters 2 and 3 of a planned book, Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract.
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© 1996 International Economics Association
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Binmore, K. (1996). Suppose Everybody Behaved Like That?. In: Allen, B. (eds) Economics in a Changing World. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25168-1_2
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