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Abstract

It has been a quarter of a century since the Johns Hopkins scholar, David Calleo, wrote that ‘the Supreme Allied Commander has never been the first servant of the Council, but the viceroy of the American president.’ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself, he asserted, was ‘the rather elaborate apparatus by which we have chosen to organize the American protectorate in Europe.’1 This was the language of revisionism in 1970, articulating a judgement that NATO was little more than an instrument of America’s imperial power. Whether that power was exploitive, as the foregoing statements imply, or benign, as the United States and many of its Allies believed, the Alliance under American leadership was a success.

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Notes

  1. David Calleo, The Atlantic Fantasy: The US, NATO, and Europe Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1970, pp.27–28.

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  2. Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,’ The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter Vol.15, September 1984, pp.1–211.

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  3. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History,’ National Interest Summer 1989, p.4.

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  4. CRS Report for Congress, 28 September 1992, Edward F. Bruner, ‘US Forces in Europe: Military Implications of Alternative Levels,’ pp.1–2.

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  5. The White House, ‘A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,’ July 1994, p.21.

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  6. Stanley R. Sloan, CRS Report for Congress, ‘Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and New Missions for NATO,’ 17 March 1994.

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  7. Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘NATO — Expand or Die?,’ New York Times 28 November 1994;

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  8. Henry Kissinger, ‘Expand NATO Now,’ Washington Post 19 December 1994.

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  9. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War Oxford University Press, New York, 1987.

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© 1996 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Kaplan, L.S. (1996). NATO After the Cold War. In: Wiener, J. (eds) The Transatlantic Relationship. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25157-5_2

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