Weapons Without a Cause

Abstract

This book has not provided an answer to the question why does the United States acquire certain weapons and not others? The answer is not straightforward but rather differs from programme to programme. However, this book has provided a framework for addressing this question. The strategic, institutional and budgetary issues surrounding each weapon must be examined in order to explain why it is acquired, partially acquired or not acquired. Strategic issues refer to the strategic rationale(s) for a weapon, institutional issues are the organisational and presidential politics surrounding its acquisition, and budgetary issues have to do with its cost. The validity of this model has been demonstrated in this study by an examination of four case studies of weapon programmes. As the next section discusses, in none of the cases examined can strategic, institutional or budgetary issues alone explain the origins, development and outcome of a programme; these conclusions are laid out in Table 5.1. In addition to developing a causal model, this book also makes some general observations about weapons acquisition in United States, in particular how strategic, institutional and budgetary issues interact (that is, their causal patterns) to produce particular programme outcomes. The overall findings of this study have important policy implications which will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.

Anybody who quotes me as saying things are good needs their bolts tightened

DoD Inspector General, Joseph Sherick¹