Abstract
This chapter analyses the main concerns of those institutions which, for the period from 1945 to 1953, were responsible for defining and shaping Italian security policies. Its main purpose is to assess whether the Italian military and the Italian Government ever perceived the threat of Soviet military aggression as real, or whether for them the Cold War took a different, subtler, dimension. It concludes that for most of the period under consideration (the main exception being the months that followed the outbreak of the Korean War) the Italian military, and the Allied occupation authorities before them, focused their attention on the domestic dimension of the Cold War rather than on the strategic problems posed by a Soviet military menace. If any external threat was perceived as serious, this was the Yugoslav rather than the Soviet one.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
I would like to express my gratitude to two Directors of the Historical Office of the Army Staff, Brig. Gen. P. Bertinaria and Col G. Gay, for allowing me full access to previously classified records of the Army Staff; the records that are not available are those from the Ministry of Defense. This chapter draws on several previous works of mine: L’esercito italiano nel secondo dopoguerra, 1945–1950 (Rome: USSME, 1989);
‘The Italian Military and the Atlantic Pact’, in E. Di Nolfo (ed.), The Signature of the Atlantic Pact Forty Years afterwards: A Historical Reappraisal, Proceedings of the International Conference held in Florence, 3–5 April 1989 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991);
‘Italy and the Defence of NATO’s Southern Flank, 1949–1955’, in K.A. Maier, N. Wiggershaus (eds), Das Nordatlantische Bündnis, 1949–1956 (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1993).
The official reply of PCI leaders is of course that there never was such a plan; see for instance the declarations that followed the aborted uprising after the attempted assassination of Togliatti: P. Secchia, Lo sciopero del 14 luglio (Rome: Rinascita, 1948) p. 27;
L. Longo, ‘La risposta del popolo’, Rinascita, 7 (July 1948) 234–5;
A similar denial can be found, inter alia, in M. Caprara, L’attentato a Togliatti. 14 luglio 1948: il PCI tra insurrezione e programma democratico (Venice: Marsilio, 1978), or in
G.C. Marino, Guerra fredda e conflitto sociale in Italia, 1947–1953 (Palermo: S. Sciascia editore, 1991) ch. 1.
A similar conclusion, but in a much more balanced presentation, is offered by P. Spriano, Le passioni di un decennio, 1946–1956 (Milan: Garzanti, 1986) p. 98.
See, for instance, the reflections of H. Macmillan, War Diaries. Politics and War in the Mediterranean, January 1943–May 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1984), under the entries of 25 March and 15 April 1945. On the ‘Greek perspective’,
see also P. Spriano, Storia del partito comunista italiano, Vol. 5, La Resistenza. Togliatti e il partito nuovo (Turin: Einaudi, 1975) ch. 16.
On the relations between Italy and the Allied powers after the armistice of 8 September 1943, see inter alia: D. Ellwood, Italy 1943–1945 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1985);
N. Kogan, Italy and the Allies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956);
J.E. Miller, The United States and Italy, 1940–1950. The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization (Chapel Hill-London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986);
H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).
E. Di Nolfo, ‘The US and Italian Communism, 1942–1946: World War II to the Cold War’, Journal of Italian History, 1, 1 (1978) 74–94.
On Trieste, see: D. De Castro, La questione di Trieste: l’azione politica e diplomatica italiana dal 1943 al 1954, 2 Vols (Trieste: LINT, 1981);
M. de Leonardis, La ‘diplomazia atlantica’ e la soluzione del problema di Trieste (1952–1954) (Naples: ESI, 1992);
A.G. de’ Robertis, Le grandi potenze e il confine giuliano, 1941–1949 (Bari: Laterza, 1983);
J.-B. Duroselle, Le Conflit de Trieste, 1943–1954 (Brussels: Institut de Sociologie de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1966);
B. Novak, Trieste 1941–1954. The Ethnic, Political and Ideological Struggle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970);
R.G. Rabel, Between East and West. Trieste, the United States, and the Cold War, 1941–1954 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988);
G. Valdevit, La questione di Trieste 1941–1954. Politica internazionale e contesto locale (Milan: Angeli, 1986).
J.E. Miller, ‘Taking Off the Gloves: the US and the Italian Elections of 1948’, Diplomatic History, 7, 4 (1983) 33–55.
On the role played by the CIA in the elections, and the ‘sense of omnipotence’ generated by its success, see P. Grose, Gentleman Spy. The Life and Times of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994) pp. 284–5.
On Great Britain and the Italian elections, see A. Varsori, ‘La Gran Bretagna e le elezioni italiane del 18 aprile 1948’, Storia Contemporariea, 13, 1 (1982) 5–70.
On the curious role of Ireland, see the fascinating essay by D. Keogh, ‘Ireland, the Vatican and the Cold War: The Case of Italy, 1948’, The Historical Journal, 34, 4 (1991) 931–52.
A. Varsori, ‘La scelta occidentale dell’Italia (1948–1949)’, Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, 1–2 (1985) 95–159, 303–68, and
L. Nuti, ‘La missione Marras, 2–22 dicembre 1948’, Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, 2 (1987).
For the growth of the Italian police force, see A. Sannino, ‘Le forze di polizia nel secondo dopoguerra (1945–1950)’, Storia Contemporanea, 16, 3 (1985) 427–85.
For the debate at the strategic level, see B. Heuser, ‘Yugoslavia in Western Military Planning 1948–1953’, in M. Milivojevic, J.B. Allcock, P. Maurer (eds), Yugoslavia’s Security Dilemmas. Armed Forces, National Defence and Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) pp. 132–5.
Tarchiani a De Gasperi, 25 dicembre 1952, in M.R. De Gasperi (ed.), De Gasperi scrive. Corrispondenza con capi di Stato, cardinali, uomini politici, giornalisti, diplomatici, 2 Vols (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1974) Vol. 2, pp. 150–1.
For a similar argument, see also A. Varsori, ‘L’Italia e la difesa dell’Occidente, 1948–1955: l’alleato sfuggente’, in Id., La politico estera italiana nel secondo dopoguerra (1943–1957) (Milan: LED, 1993).
On Italian security and defence policies see also L. Nuti, ‘Appunti per una storia della politica di difesa italiana nella prima metà degli anni’ 50’, in E. Di Nolfo, R. Rainero, B. Vigezzi (eds), L’Italia e la politica di potenza in Europa negli anni, 50 (Milan: Marzorati, 1992).
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1996 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Nuti, L. (1996). Security and Perceptions of Threat in Italy in the Early Cold War Years, 1945–53. In: Gori, F., Pons, S. (eds) The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–53. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25106-3_26
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25106-3_26
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-25108-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-25106-3
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)