Human infants are beings who are obviously vulnerable to the vicissitudes of life in general and who tend to invoke in us special concern and care. One might therefore expect that our moral thinking would show why this special regard somehow cohered with basic moral features of the human condition. It is somewhat surprising that one of the major theories of moral value should not only devalue the intuitions that surround human infants but actually suggest that such intuitions are radically mistaken.1 I shall use this counterintuitive conclusion about young human beings to explore the basic claims and commitments of consequentialism as a metaethical theory.
KeywordsExpense Posite Dition Defend Bage
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