Abstract
This chapter explores the rationales and contexts for sanctions in the United Nations and in organizations and groups with limited membership and seeks to disentangle the variety of motives and intentions which prompt national governments to adopt collective measures inside or outside institutional frameworks. Chapter 1 made the point that the concept of international sanctions in the twentieth century was a departure from the traditional use of economic measures as a prelude or supplement to war, as retaliation for injury, or to gain advantages from other states. League of Nations sanctions — President Woodrow Wilson’s ‘economic, silent, deadly remedy’1 — were intended to replace military means of checking aggression by serving as a deterrent and if necessary as a corrective. Collective security optimistically envisaged the principle ‘one for all and all for one’ working to make the world a more peaceful place.
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Notes and References
Cited in Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) p. 9.
See Geoffrey Edwards and Christopher Hill, ‘European Political Cooperation 1989–91’, Yearbook of European Law, vol. 11, 1991, pp. 489–519.
See Carter, International Economic Sanctions, pp. 223–8; Martin Holland, ‘The European Community and South Africa’, International Affairs, vol. 64, 3 (1988) pp. 415–30.
See Domingo E. Acevedo, ‘The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response’, in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), Collective Intervention in Internal Conflict (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993) pp. 119–55.
James Barber, ‘Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument’, International Affairs, vol. 55, 3 (1979) pp. 367–84.
See particularly, Baldwin, Economic Statecraft; James Lindsay, ‘Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 30 (1986) pp. 153–73; Kim Richard Nossal, ‘International Sanctions as International Punishment’, International Organization, vol. 43, 2 (1989) pp. 301–22.
Joe Clark, Speech to the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, 18 February 1987. Ottawa: Dept. of External Affairs Statements and Speeches, 1987.
Nor did personal charm. See Anthony Sampson’s report that ‘The other [Commonwealth] Prime Ministers chose Rajiv Gandhi and Brian Mulroney from India and Canada to lobby her personally, as two good-looking men representing important countries, but with no success.’ Black and Gold: Tycoons, Revolutionaries and Apartheid (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1987) p. 218.
See Karen Lissakers, ‘Money and Manipulation’, Foreign Policy, no. 44 (Fall 1981) pp. 107–26.
US Dept. of State Current Policy, no. 194, Washington DC, 5 June 1980.
Baldwin, Economic Statecraft; see, too, Peggy Falkenheim, ‘Post-Afghanistan Sanctions’, in David Leyton-Brown (ed.), The Utility of International Economic Sanctions (Beckenham, Kent: Croom Helm, 1987) pp. 105–30.
Commodities Report in The Wall Street Journal, 19 June 1995. See, too, Fareed Mohammedi and Roger Diwan, ‘The Saudis, the French and the Embargo’, Middle East Report, vol. 25, 2 (1995) pp. 24–5.
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© 1996 Margaret P. Doxey
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Doxey, M.P. (1996). Contexts and Frameworks for Sanctions and the Intentions of Senders. In: International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25016-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25016-5_3
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