Superpower Summitry

  • Michael Andersen
  • Theo Farrell
Part of the Studies in Diplomacy book series (STD)

Abstract

Superpower summitry is history. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 only one superpower remains and, like the tango, it takes two superpowers to have a superpower summit. The term superpower grew out of the cold war and the special conditions of that period. Post-war bipolarity was based on US and Soviet military dominance, especially in terms of nuclear weapons. There was a series of summit meetings between the four victorious powers after the Second World War but, by 1949, it was clear that the world had split into two blocs led by the United States and Soviet Union respectively. From then on, with the exception of a meeting in 1955, real summits were bilateral affairs.1

Keywords

Europe Explosive Arena Boris Stake 

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Notes and References

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Andersen
  • Theo Farrell

There are no affiliations available

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