Abstract
Superpower summitry is history. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 only one superpower remains and, like the tango, it takes two superpowers to have a superpower summit. The term superpower grew out of the cold war and the special conditions of that period. Post-war bipolarity was based on US and Soviet military dominance, especially in terms of nuclear weapons. There was a series of summit meetings between the four victorious powers after the Second World War but, by 1949, it was clear that the world had split into two blocs led by the United States and Soviet Union respectively. From then on, with the exception of a meeting in 1955, real summits were bilateral affairs.1
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Notes and References
There was a summit between the United States, Soviet Union and France in Paris in 1960 but it was a wash-out as Khrushchev stormed out over the U2 affair.
Lyndon Johnson may be the exception in that he only met the official Soviet Premier, Alexi Kosygin, when the de facto leader was Leonid Brezhnev.
Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (NY, Harper and Row, 1965), p. 542.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (NY, Doubleday, 1965), p. 432; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (London, Collins, 1982), pp. 241, 246; Lou Cannon, President Reagan: Role of a Lifetime (NY, Simon and Schuster, 1991), p. 263.
William Curti Wolhforth, The Elusive Balance (Ithaca, NJ, Cornell University Press, 1993).
20 s’ezd Kommunitisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: Stenograficheskii octhet (Moscow, Isdatal’stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1956).
Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, p. 141.
Martin Walker, The Cold War (London, Vintage, 1994), pp. 133, 156.
Adam Ulam, Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 294–5.
Ulam, Coexistence, p. 294.
Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, tr. Strobe Talbott (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1974), pp. 368–416.
Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 584–6.
Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, pp. 184–6; Peter J. Mooney, The Soviet Superpower: the Soviet Union 1945–80 (London, Heinemann, 1982), p. 120.
Gordon R. Weihmiller and Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits: An Account of East-West Diplomacy at the Top, 1955–985 (Lanham, University Press of America, 1986), p. 32.
Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation (Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 294–5.
Michael MccGwire, Perestroika and Soviet National Security Policy (Washington DC, Brookings Instituton, 1991), p. 82.
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 271.
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p. 320.
Michael Andersen, interview with Gorbachev adviser and director of IMEMO, Moscow, April 1992; Andersen interview with Andrei Kortunov, USA-Canada Institute, Moscow, April 1990.
Weihmiller and Doder, US-Soviet Summits, p. 68.
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp. 33–4.
W. Isaacson, Kissinger (London, Faber and Faber, 1992), p. 433.
George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (NY, Scribner’s, 1993), p. 987.
Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 254.
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp. 630–60; Carmel Budiardjo, ‘Indonesia: Mass Extermination and the Consolidation of Authoritarian Power’ in Alexander George (ed.), Western State Terrorism (Oxford, Polity Press, 1991), pp. 180–211.
Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 259–60.
Shultz, Triumph and Turmoil, pp. 1094–6, 1101–4.
In addition, there was the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty which was signed at a meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Paris in 1990.
Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 407.
Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1000.
Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 429, 433; Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 1217.
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp. 448–9.
Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 752.
Weihmiller and Doder, US-Soviet Summits, p. 66; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 597, 751.
Robert Ferrell (ed.), The Eisenhower Diaries (NY and London, W. W. Norton and Co., 1981), p. 262 [italic added].
Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower the President: Volume Two, 1952–1969 (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 565.
Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 263.
Matthew Evangelista, ‘Stalin’s Postwar Army Reappraised’, International Security, vol. 7, no. 3 (1982–3), pp. 110–38.
David Goldfischer, The Best Defense: Policy Alternatives for US Nuclear Security from the 1950s to the 1980s (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 109.
Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (NY and London, Penguin Books, 1985) pp. 171–2, 175.
MccGwire, Perestroika and Soviet National Security Policy, pp. 21–3.
Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 182–8.
MccGwire, Perestroika and Soviet National Security Policy, pp. 24–30.
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp. 802–3.
Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition (Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 765–6.
The best sources to consult on the domestic politics of national security policy, and on which much of the discussion in this section is based, are: Steven E. Miller, ‘Politics Over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms Control’, International Security, vol. 8, no. 4 (1984), pp. 79–90; (on bureaucratic politics) Hedrick Smith, The Power Game (NY, Random House, 1988), chapters 15 and 16; Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II (NY, Harper and Row, 1980); Talbott, Deadly Gambits (London, Picador, 1984); (on Congress) Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security: Congress and US Defence Policy (NY and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990); Paul N. Stockton, ‘The New Game on the Hill: The Politics of Arms Control and Strategic Force Modernization’, International Security, vol. 16, no. 2 (1991), pp. 146–71.
For a brilliant summary of the Soviet preoccupation with military security and its implications, refer to MccGwire, Perestroika and Soviet National Security Policy, pp. 1–44.
Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, pp. 140–1.
Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, p. 260.
Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p. 297.
MccGwire, Perestroika and Soviet National Security Policy, pp. 1–13.
Vestnik, MID SSSR 2, 26 August 1987, p. 31.
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© 1996 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Andersen, M., Farrell, T. (1996). Superpower Summitry. In: Dunn, D.H. (eds) Diplomacy at the Highest Level. Studies in Diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24915-2_5
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