Dislocating the Soul

Abstract

In philosophy of religion we are often offered analyses which pay no attention to, and hence fail to capture, the ‘soul’ in the words of religious beliefs. When this happens we have a dislocation of language, including a dislocation of language concerning the soul. This dislocation is fed from many sources, not all of them philosophical. It is fed by the character of certain desires that go deep in us. A philosopher may want to heal these dislocations. Given their character, more than the intelligence of the audience will need to be addressed. Contact will have to be made with their souls as well.

There might also be a language in whose use the ‘soul’ of the words played no part. In which, for example, we have no objection to replacing one word by another arbitrary one of our own invention.

We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by another. (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.)

In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by those words in those positions. (Understanding a poem.) (Wittgenstein, PI, I: 530–1)